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ARTICLE
BONDAGE, DOMINATION, AND THE ART OF
THE DEAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGIES IN LENDER LIABILITY
GOOD FAITH LITIGATION
A. BROOKE OVERBY*
In the 1980s the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing achieved
preeminence in the area of lender liability. This raised concerns that expansive
judicial interpretation of the obligation would, in effect, rewrite the parties' con-
tracts and result in the imposition of undue economic liability upon lenders. In
this Article Professor Overby first traces the statutory, common law, and theoreti-
cal attempts to provide transactors with legal standards of conduct through the
obligation of good faith. She then examines the judicial approaches to good faith
in the lending context, rejecting as unfounded concerns over economic liability or
widespread judicial activism. Professor Overby demonstrates that the underlying
divergence in the courts over proper interpretation of the obligation of good faith
is the primary cause of the "lender liability crisis " Finally, the Article proposes
an "effectiveness of express terms" approach to good faith lending under which
the obligation of good faith in no way overrides the explicit terms of the lending
agreement absent proof of opportunism.
INTRODUCTION
the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing has become
subject of intense scrutiny in the area of law broadly denomi-
nated as "lender liability."' Good faith issues arise in lending relation-
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; B.A. 1982, Northwestern Uni-
versity; J.D., 1987, University of Iowa College of Law. The author thanks Paul Barron,
Lloyd Bonfield, Steve Burton, Bill Lovett, John Stick, and Mark Wessman for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Article. Lisa Hack, Tulane '92 and Heather McDougald,
Tulane '94 provided immensely helpful research assistance.
1. The term "lender liability" in its broadest sense refers to imposition of any legal
liability on a lender. Theories of liability range from breach of contract, see Yankton
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 365 N.W.2d 430, 433-34 (Neb. 1985), to breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud, see Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 192-95 (Mont. 1984), liability for
hazardous waste clean-up costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), see, eg., United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1Ith Cir. 1990) (having security interest and becoming active
in management of borrower results in liability of lender under CERCLA), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), and civil liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), see, e.g., Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d
1406, 1411-13 (3d Cir.) (dismissing RICO claim), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2834 (1991);
Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 447-48 (1st Cir. 1990) (sustaining RICO claim).
See generally Helen D. Chaitman, The Law of Lender Liability (1990). Although the
area of "lender liability" has been referred to as an "emerging" field, see e.g., 1-3 Ameri-
can Bar Association, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability (H. Chaitman ed. 1985)
(materials from program on "emerging theories"); John 0. Tyler, Jr., Emerging Theories
of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L. Rev. 411 (1987) (reviewing developments in
"new" Texas lender liability cases), the contract law claims of wrongful conduct asserted
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ships in a number of situations, such as when a lender refuses to make
advances under a line of credit,2 accelerates or demands payment of the
debt due under a note,3 attempts to foreclose on or to repossess collat-
eral,4 or refuses to renegotiate terms of the loan.' According to one
writer, successful claims in the 1980s against lenders for breach of the
obligation of good faith6 "dramatically changed the conventional under-
by borrowers are grounded in familiar doctrine such as the obligation of good faith, mod-
ification, waiver, estoppel, and fraud. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752, 758-63 (6th Cir. 1985) (good faith); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 291-
93 (Alaska 1983) (modification, waiver, and estoppel); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 680-82 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (fraud).
Despite its breadth, which encompasses a myriad of doctrinal areas, courts have in-
creasingly used the catch-phrase "lender liability" to denote a discrete cause of action.
See Richter, S.A. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir.
1991); Sanders v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 B.R. 507, 509 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), aff'd sub nam.
Sanders v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 936 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1991); Savers Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 940, 941 (W.D. Tenn. 1989);
Daniels v. Army Nat'l Bank, 822 P.2d 39, 41 (Kan. 1991); Check Reporting Servs., Inc.
v. Michigan Nat'l Bank - Lansing, 478 N.W.2d 893, 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Frank
Lerner & Assocs. v. Merchants & Mechanics Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 90AP-1045,
1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2938, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20, 1991); Nance v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 803 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). The growing trend toward clas-
sifying debtor-creditor issues under the category "Lender Liability" represents a move-
ment toward a paradigmatic approach to classification on relational grounds. The
conflict is placed initially within the ambit of the debtor-creditor relation rather than
within a particular doctrinal area. Cf Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classifica-
tion, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 661, 715 (1989) (stating that relational paradigms reduce framing
bias). Subsuming the doctrinal classifications into the relation emphasizes common
norms within the relation rather than different norms embedded in the distinct doctrinal
categories. See id. at 715-16.
2. See Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 11 (Ist Cir. 1987); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 1985); Taggart & Taggart Seed, Inc. v. First Tenn.
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 230, 232 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir.
1989); First Nat'l Bank v. Sylvester, 554 N.E.2d 1063, 1065-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Crec-
ger Brick & Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989).
3. See Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., v. Bank of Boston (In re Martin Specialty
Vehicles, Inc.), 87 B.R. 752, 764-65 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 97
B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989); Pavco Indus., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 534 So. 2d 572, 576
(Ala. 1988); Richards Eng'rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1033-34 (Colo. Ct. App.
1987); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Simon v. New Hampshire Sav. Bank, 296 A.2d 913, 915 (N.H. 1972); J.R. Hale Con-
tracting Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M. 1990).
4. See Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 297-99 (Alaska 1983); Van Bibber
v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122-23 (Ind. 1981); Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437
So. 2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983); Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 617-18
(Mont. 1990); Production Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (N.D. 1990);
Clayton v. Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1982).
5. See Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 532-35 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986); Central Bank v. Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 713-14 (Mont. 1985); Cascade
Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 612 P.2d 332, 332-33 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Secur-
ity Bank v. Dalton, 803 S.W.2d 443, 448-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Badgett v. Security
State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 359-61 (Wash. 1991); Lawrence v. Farm Credit Sys. Capital
Corp., 761 P.2d 640, 651-52 (Wyo. 1988).
6. See Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 12-16 (1st Cir. 1987); K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-63 (6th Cir. 1985); Martin Specialty Vehicles, 87 B.R.
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standing of the relationship between lenders and their borrowers."7 As
firms and individuals struggle with debts incurred in the last decade, alle-
gations by borrowers of bad faith lender behavior show more potential
for increase than for decline.' It is thus not surprising that both the
banking bar 9 and academics'" have paid considerable attention to the ob-
at 765-69; Ricci v. Key Bancshares Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D. Me. 1987); Farmers
& Merchants Bank v. Hancock, 506 So. 2d 305, 311-14 (Ala. 1987).
7. Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 Yale LJ. 131, 131
(1989).
8. [In the 1980s, c]onsumers, governments and businesses . .. borrowed as
never before. It [was] the decade of the five-year Yugo loan, the leveraged-
buyout loan, the unsecured bridge loan, the teaser-rate adjustable-rate mortgage
loan, the rescheduled Brazilian or Mexican loan, the Sotheby's art-quality loan
and the liposuction and breast-enlargement loan. It [was] the decade of retract-
able facsimile bonds, subordinated primary capital perpetual floating rate notes
and collateralized fixed-rate multi-tranche tap notes. All in all, the 1980s [were]
to debt what the 1960s were to sex.
James Grant, Michael Milken, meet Sewell Avery, Forbes 400, Oct. 23, 1989, at 60, 60; see
also Stella Dawson, Bankers Blame Credit Crunch on Weak Demand, Not Regulators,
Reuters, Oct. 7, 1991 ("The U.S. debt burden tripled in the 1980s as consumers borrowed
on their homes [and] corporations took on more debt [from leveraged buyouts and
restructurings]."); Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992) ("In these difficult economic times with falling real estate prices, lender liability
suits have become one of the few 'growth industries.' ").
9. See generally Chaitman, supra note 1, 4.01-4.06; 1-3 American Bar Associa-
tion, supra note 1; Scott L. Baena, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability, Fla. BJ., Jan.
1987, at 55; A. Barry Cappello, Banking Malpractice?, Case & Com., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at
3; John C. Chobot, Objective Aspects of Good Faith in Insecurity Clause Debt Accelera-
tions, 94 Com. LJ. 13 (1989); Lawrence F. Flick, II & Dennis Replansky, Liability of
Banks to their Borrowersv Pitfalls and Protections, 103 Banking L.J. 220 (1986); Loeb H.
Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Applications of Old Concepts,
104 Banking L.J. 80 (1986); Janine S. Hiller, Good Faith Lending, 26 Am. Bus. LJ. 783
(1989); Ted T. Kitada, Emerging Theories of Bank Liability-The Breach of the Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 103 Banking L.J. 80 (1986); Debra C. Moss, Borrowers
Fight Back with Lender Liability, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1987, at 64; Glenn D. West &
Michael P. Haggerty, The "Demandable" Note and the Obligation of Good Faith, 21 UCC
L.J. 99 (1988).
10. See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 375, 460-63 (1990); Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Good Faith and
Fair Dealing in Commercial Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and Beyond,
49 Ohio St. L.J. 1237 (1989) [hereinafter Ebke & Griffin, Covenant to Duty and Beyond];
Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors" Toward a Conceptual
Framework, 40 Sw. L.i. 775 (1986) [hereinafter Ebke & Griffin, Conceptual Framework];
Carolyn M. Edwards, Article 3 Demand Notes and the Doctrine of Good Faith, 74 Marq.
L. Rev. 481 (1991); Fischel, supra note 7; Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships
and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. Legal Stud. 535, 565-74 (1990);
William H. Lawrence & Robert D. Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in
Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63 Ind. L.J. 825 (1988); Steve H. Nickles, The
Objectification of Debtor-Creditor Relations, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 371 (1989); Dennis M.
Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 Iowa
L. Rev. 503 (1991) [hereinafter Patterson, Easterbrook on Good Faith]; Dennis M. Patter-
son, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgen-
stein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169 (1989) [hereinafter
Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability]; Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the
Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 335 (1988) [hereinafter Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code]; Tyler, supra
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ligation of good faith and liability of lenders thereunder.
Whether the contractual obligation of good faith has generated a
lender liability crisis is debatable. Despite a number of well-publicized
jury decisions,"1 overall the reported cases decided in favor of the lender
outnumber those in favor of the borrower by a margin of nearly three to
one. 2 This margin reflects victories both on the merits and on proce-
dural grounds. Lenders are and have been winning in the courts.
Nonetheless, the steadily increasing number of reported cases in the
area evidences a lender liability litigation crisis."' Micronesian Yachts
Co. v. Bank of Guam,'4 a recent case before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, demonstrates the enormously time-con-
suming and costly nature of this litigation. In Micronesian Yachts, the
Bank of Guam agreed on March 23, 1983 to lend $175,000 to Microne-
sian Yachts Company ("MYC"), with the first payment of principal and
interest due from MYC in August 1983.15 After MYC failed to make the
required payment in August, the parties agreed in September of 1983 to
delay payment of principal until November of that year.' 6 In October,
MYC made the first of what would be numerous demands over the next
note 1, at 413-3 1; Jonathan K. Van Patten, Lender Liability: Changing or Enforcing the
Ground Rules?, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 387 (1988).
For a sampling of student works in the area, see Frances E. Freund et al., Special
Project: Lender Liability, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 853 (1989); Jill P. Anderson, Comment,
Lender Liabilityfor Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36 Emory L.J.
917 (1987); James R. Borders, Note, The Growth of Lender Liability: An Economic Per-
spective, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1987); Melissa Cassedy, Note, The Doctrine of Lender Lia-
bility, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 165, 189-200 (1988); Kenneth J. Goldberg, Note, Lender
Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 653 (1988); A.J. Herbert III, Comment, Lender
Liability: Good Faith and Demand Notes, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 187 (1989); Note, Lender Lia-
bility: Breach of Good Faith in Lending and Related Theories, 64 N.D. L. Rev. 273
(1988); Patricia A. Milon, Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liability for Financial Institutions?, 40 Vand. L. Rev.
1197 (1987); Jane L. Rodda, Note, The Role of Good Faith in Lender Liability Suits:
Rising Star or Fading Gadfly?, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 939 (1989); Mark Snyderman, Comment,
What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commer-
cial Lending, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1335 (1988).
11. See, e.g., Nancy Blodgett, Lender Liability Still Lurking, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988,
at 42 (discussing Landes Constr. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987)
and Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
12. See infra app. A. A few authors have suggested that the lender liability explosion
may in fact be a dud. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Law of
Debtors and Creditors 46-47 (2d ed. 1991); Warren L. Dennis & Michael I. Endler, Bank
of America and Penthouse: Is the Lender Liability Pendulum Swinging Back?, 43 Con-
sumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 3, 3 (1989); Mark Thompson, Santa Barbara's Resident Barracuda,
Cal. Law., June 1989, at 63; Blodgett, supra note 11, at 42.
13. See infra app. A.
14. 952 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (reported as table case), No. 90-16663, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 865 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (mem.).
15. See Micronesian Yachts, No. 90-16663, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 865, at *1 (9th
Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
16. See id. at *2.
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two years that Bank of Guam aid it in securing alternative financing.' 7
MYC's interest payments-and in fact all payments-stopped in Decem-
ber of 1983.1 After nearly three years of negotiation and repeated re-
quests from MYC that Bank of Guam aid in finding MYC alternative
financing, in October 1986 the bank agreed to accept $228,800 to retire
MYC's note19 which, because of accrued interest, was worth over
$247,000.20
The credit agreement in Micronesian Yachts expressly allowed the
bank to accelerate all amounts outstanding upon default.21 One unversed
in lender liability law might, therefore, think the Bank of Guam either
worthy of commendation for refraining from exercising its express rights
under the agreement, or of condemnation for settling for less than full
value. Bank of Guam instead received a complaint filed by MYC, alleg-
ing that Bank of Guam breached its contractual obligation of good faith
and fair dealing. 2 The Bank of Guam's nearly decade-long, 23 and no
doubt costly, legal odyssey seeking to defend its right to collect from
MYC is instructive. Have lender liability cases in the area of contractual
good faith, together with the relevant scholarship, facilitated the efficient,
predictable, and fair resolution of such disputes? That the dispute re-
quired the intervention of the second highest court in the United States
indicates that over a decade of lender liability litigation, and an even
longer period of theoretical attempts to conceptualize the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing," have come up short.
17. See id at *2-*4. The financing would be used to pay off the loan from Bank of
Guam. At no time did MYC seek out alternative financing on its own.
18. See id at *4 n.5. MYC only paid $22.73 of the $175,000 principal. See id.
19. See id. at *3-*4. $28,800 of the settlement was in the form of a promissory note
guaranteed by MYC's president and principal shareholder, which note was in default at
the time the case was ultimately decided. See id. at * 13 n.7.
20. See id. at *13.
21. See Plaintiffs'-Appellants' Excerpts of Record at 29, Micronesian Yachts (No. 90-
16663).
22. See Micronesian Yachts, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 865, at 15. MYC alleged "that
since the 3/23 contract allowed MYC to prepay the loan, the bank had a duty not to
frustrate MYC's attempts at refinancing and had a duty to take reasonable measures to
assist MYC in obtaining refinancing." Id at *12. In addition, MYC alleged that the
bank delayed in finding it alternative financing in order to take advantage of the higher
interest rates on the loan. MYC also alleged breach of contract, intentional and negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and antitrust violations under the Bank Holding Company Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988). See id The president and principal shareholder of MYC
claimed "that as a result of the bank's outrageous conduct, he has suffered many sleepless
nights and stomach upset," resulting in the Bank's liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at *16.
23. After a three day trial in 1990, the United States District Court of the North
Mariana Islands entered judgment for the Bank of Guam, see id. at *5, and in 1992 the
United States Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. See id.
24. See generally Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73
Iowa L. Rev. 299 (1988); Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract,
75 Iowa L. Rev. 861 (1990); Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Perform-
ance Patterson and a State Law Alternative, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 431 (1990)
[hereinafter Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance]; Steven J. Burton,
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW[
This Article, based upon a survey of over 200 good faith lending
cases, 25 traces the theoretical and judicial dissensions over the appropri-
ate conceptualization of the contractual obligation of good faith in the
lender liability area. The crux of the lender liability debate lies in the
relationship between the express terms of a lending agreement and the
limitations, if any, that good faith may impose on a lender's invocation of
those terms. Dissensions over this issue, rather than over lenders' eco-
nomic liability, lie at the heart of the lender liability crisis. Accordingly,
criticisms of recent pro-borrower good faith cases are unwarranted to the
extent grounded in concerns that good faith has become a "loose can-
More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 Iowa
L. Rev. 497 (1984) [hereinafter Burton, Reply]; Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Perform-
ance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 1
(1981) [hereinafter Burton, Article 2 Good Faith]; Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369 (1980) [here-
inafter Burton, Common Law Good Faith]; Russell A. Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the
Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1971);
E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963); Fischel, supra note 7;
Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 Duke L.J. 619;
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev.
521, 552-72 (1981); Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10; B.J. Reiter,
Good Faith in Contracts, 17 Val. U. L. Rev. 705 (1983); Robert S. Summers, The General
Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810
(1982) [hereinafter Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization]; Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of The Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law]. See generally sources cited supra note 10.
25. The sheer volume of claims against lending institutions grounded in good faith
necessitated limiting the survey to a lender's contractual obligation of good faith under
lending agreements. For example, the following areas were omitted from the scope of the
survey: (1) claims clearly asserted only in tort not bearing significantly on the scope of
the contractual obligation of good faith, see, e.g., Brown-Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant
Sav. Bank, 527 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (refusing to apply bad faith tort to a refusal
to lend situation), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1361 (1 lth Cir. 1983); (2) claims of bad faith in pre-
contractual negotiation or based upon a commitment letter rather than upon a credit
agreement, see, e.g., Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Mun. Leasing Corp., 716 F.2d 543 (8th
Cir. 1983); (3) bad faith repossession under Article 9 of the U.C.C., particularly U.C.C.
§ 9-504, see, e.g., Sufflield Bank v. LaRoche, 752 F. Supp. 54 (D.R.I. 1990); (4) good faith
obligations toward a guarantor rather than the principal debtor, see, e.g., Continental
Bank, N.A. v. Modansky, 129 B.R. 159, 161-62 (N.D. Ill. 1991); (5) holder in due course
requirements under Article 3 of the U.C.C., see, e.g., Bowling Green Inc. v. State Street
Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970); (6) bank/depositor relationships under
Article 4 of the U.C.C., see, e.g., Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 739 P.2d 554 (Or.
1987); (7) a creditor's alleged bad faith filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition, see,
e.g., In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992); (8) exercise of due on sale
clauses prior to or as permitted by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, see, e.g., Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 364 A.2d 558 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1976); (9) intercreditor disputes, see, e.g., Walter E. Heller W. Inc. v. Tecrim
Corp. 241 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); (10) preclusion of good faith claims under
the D'Oench Duhme doctrine, see, e.g., Baumann v. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934
F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992); and (11) bond financings
(which usually involve the good faith of the borrower), see, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
[Vol. 61
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non" decimating scores of financial institutions with exorbitant damages
awards26 or that courts have engaged in widespread remaking of con-
tracts based upon personal notions of fairness.2" The obligation of good
faith has proven problematic in lender liability law not because it results
in expansive liability but rather because it generates inconsistent, unpre-
dictable rules of conduct.
A comprehensive examination of the extent to which current theories
have been adopted by courts reveals contradictory judicial positions on
good faith. These positions are consciously chosen and irreconcilable on
a theoretical level. For example, the perceived crisis of the 1980s has
generated a discernible judicial shift toward a more restrictive, literalist
interpretation of the obligation of good faith.28 Increasingly, courts are
questioning the celebrated 1985 case of K.M. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,29
the vanguard of pro-borrower forces. In K.M.C., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expansively applied the obligation
of good faith when it held that good faith required the lender to give
26. See William D. Warren, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in 1
American Bar Association, supra note 1, at 58; J. Anderson, Comment, supra note 10, at
918; Cassedy, Note, supra note 10, at 200 (borrowers have had "phenomenal success"
using good faith); Herbert, Comment, supra note 10, at 188-89; Milon, Recent Develop-
ment, supra note 10; Rodda, Note, supra note 10, at 958; Snyderman, Comment, supra
note 10, at 1337.
27. See, e.g., Ebke & Griffin, Covenant to Duty and Beyond, supra note 10, at 1247-49;
Ebke & Griffin, Conceptual Framework, supra note 10, at 798 ("[Tlhe actionable theory
of good faith and fair dealing is too broad and inconcrete.. . ."); Fischel, supra note 7, at
142-46 (criticizing decisions); Lawrence & Wilson, supra note 10, at 825-26; Tyler, supra
note 1, at 447 (criticizing "unbridled expansion" of duty of good faith where fact finder
decides on what seems fair); Robert C. Williamson, Jr. & Brenda Kay Tanner, Lender
Liability in Mississippi" A Survey, Comparison and Comment, 57 Miss. L.J. 1, 21 (1987)
(criticizing the superimposition of "an ambiguous duty of fairness"); C. Anderson, Note,
supra note 10, at 313-14; J. Anderson, Comment, supra note 10, at 966-70; Borders, Note,
supra note 10, at 740-42 (courts have extended obligation beyond intended scope); Her-
bert, Comment, supra note 10, at 214 (good faith too broad and inconcrete); Snyderman,
Comment, supra note 10, at 1338 (good faith "allows judges and juries to substitute their
conceptions of reasonableness and fairness for those of [the] parties").
Criticism of imposing liability on banks, however, has not been entirely unanimous.
See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract
Law, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 697, 734-36 (1990) (imposing liability consistent with legal
obligation of good faith); Cappello, supra note 9, at 7 ("The banks' days of treating bor-
rowers as second-class citizens are over."); Nickles, supra note 10, at 385 (net economic
cost of lender liability cases is justified); Van Patten, supra note 10, at 436 (lender liability
cases curb abuses and unfair conduct and hold banks accountable for actions); Goldberg,
Note, supra note 10, at 680 (good faith polices over-aggressive financial institutions).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 271-308.
29. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (2d Cir. 1992); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First
Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1990); National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross,
130 B.R. 656, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom Yaeger v. National Westminister, 962
F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1992); Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81 B.R. 194, 199
(D. Mass. 1987); East Lansing State Bank v. Red Cedar Constr. Co. (In re Red Cedar
Constr. Co.), 63 B.R. 228, 235-38 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986); Flagship Nat'l Bank v.
Gray Distribution Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Centerre
Bank of Kan. City, N.A. v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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notice prior to refusing to make advances under a line of credit.30
KM C, taken with the backlash against it, illustrates the absence of syn-
thesis in current good faith law. Depending upon the court, good faith in
lending relationships may now impose a nebulous obligation of "funda-
mental integrity"'3 I on the lender. Alternatively, good faith may preclude
"objectively oppressive and unfair"32 behavior or may merely be just a
small part of a larger "fablel" 33 fascinating to children but put aside by
adults.
Thus, the current state of good faith law in lending arrangements con-
travenes the essential, recognized need in contract law for uniformity and
certainty.34 Inconsistent views in the courts on the meaning of good faith
provide little guidance for transactors, leading to cases such as Microne-
sian Yachts. Irreconcilable judicial attitudes also offer borrowers a po-
tentially loaded gun in the form of a threat of litigation35 yet,
concurrently, fail to provide lenders with standards by which they can
act to avoid litigation. The failure of lender liability cases to generate
predictable rules of good faith conduct demands a reassessment of the
appropriate scope of the obligation of good faith.
Part I of this Article sets forth the current leading statutory and theo-
retical attempts to conceptualize the obligation of good faith.36 Part II
assesses the extent to which courts have implemented the competing the-
oretical conceptualizations.37 This Part points out that although each
theory has garnered some support in the courts, no clear consensus has
emerged. Part III analyzes the doctrinal implications of the current judi-
cial approaches to good faith issues.38 Part IV advocates adoption of the
30. See K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 759-60; see also infra text accompanying notes 193-227.
31. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1964).
32. Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., v. Bank of Boston (In re Martin Specialty Vehi-
cles, Inc.), 87 B.R. 752, 766 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 97 B.R. 721
(D. Mass. 1989).
33. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990).
34. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1990); Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization,
supra note 24, at 823; see also Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian
Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1175, 1193-94 (1992) ("[I]t
would seem desirable to have discernable legal precepts by which lawyers could advise
both behemoths and individuals alike as to whether they are exposing themselves to the
weight of legal coercion.").
35. See, e.g., Howard Oaks, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, No. S 92-3331, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 287, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 1993) ("Indeed, the very filing of [a lender
malpractice] suit, in which the borrower essentially blames the lender for its business
failure, might remind the lay observer of Danton's famous exhortation to the Legislative
Assembly, 'II nous faut de l'audace, encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace'... .") (quot-
ing Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 412 n.l (15th ed. 1980)); In re Hanson Indus., Inc., 88
B.R. 942, 948 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (threat of huge judgments and pro-borrower juries
"is precisely [the] type of concern which has caused the Bank to offer the settlement it has
offered in this case").
36. See infra text accompanying notes 40-158.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 159-308.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 309-55.
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"effectiveness of express terms" judicial approach to good faith.39 Fi-
nally, this Article concludes that, absent adoption of the effectiveness of
express terms approach, the failure of courts to generate a consistent
body of good faith law supports abolishing the obligation of good faith in
lending arrangements.
I. CURRENT STANDARDS/THEORIES
Any claim that a lender acted in bad faith necessarily stems initially
from the statutory and common law provisions imposing the obligation
of good faith in lending agreements. This Section will first set forth the
current statutory and common law requirements for contractual good
faith." A synopsis of the principal academic theories of good faith, inex-
tricably linked to imposition of the legal obligation, will then follow."'
A. Statutory and Common Law Provisions on Good Faith
Both the Uniform Commercial Code42 (the "Code") and the Restate-
ment (Second) of ContractS4 3 (the "Restatement") impose an obligation
of good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of
contracts.' However, the Code and the Restatement take divergent
39. See infra text accompanying notes 356-78.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 42-72.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 73-158.
42. Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: "Every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
In late 1992, while this Article was in the process of publication, the Permanent Edito-
rial Board of the Code began consideration of a PEB Commentary on § 1-203. The pro-
posed commentary rejects the proposition that § 1-203 creates an independent cause of
action:
Rather, [§ 1-203] means that a failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a
specific duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes a breach of that con-
tract. This distinction makes it clear that the doctrine of good faith merely
directs a court towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in
which they are created, performed and enforced.
PEB Commentary on § 1-203 (Draft Proposal) at 11-12 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
The proposed commentary adopts the deeply interpretivist approach to good faith, see
infra text accompanying notes 105-15, which has achieved only nominal judicial accept-
ance in the lender liability area, see infra note 252 and accompanying text, and which this
Article rejects, see infra text accompanying notes 356-78.
43. Section 205 of the Restatement provides: "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981).
44. The general good faith obligation in U.C.C. § 1-203 only refers to "good faith,"
while the general Restatement obligation encompasses both "good faith" and "fair deal-
ing." See supra notes 42-43. The U.C.C. definitions of good faith only encompass "fair
dealing" with respect to merchants involved in exchanges covered by Article 2 of the
U.C.C. and with respect to transactions covered by Articles 2A (Leases), 3 (Negotiable
Instruments), 4 (Bank Collections), and 4A (Electronic Transfers). See U.C.C. §§ 2-
103(1)(b), 2A-103(3), 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c), 4A-105(a)(6) (1990); see also Burton, Article
2 Good Faith, supra note 24, at 26-27, 26 n. 146 (discussing tension between §§ 1-203 and
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views on the definition and interpretation of the obligation.
The Code adopts a definitional approach to good faith. Other than
with respect to merchants under Article 2, and other than generally
under Articles 2A, 3, 4, and 4A of the Code, the Code standard for
"good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."45 In the remaining areas, good faith not only includes hon-
esty in fact but also "observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing."4 6 In good faith lending cases, the proper application of the
Code's "honesty in fact" standard, rather than the broader standard of
"observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing," has
been the main source of judicial debate.47 For example, courts have ap-
plied conflicting standards for when a lender acts "honest[ly] in fact."
2-103(l)(b) and between U.C.C. and common-law interpretations of good faith and fair
dealing).
45. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990). Prior to the 1990 revisions to Articles 3 and 4, those
articles also used the "honesty in fact" definition of good faith. See U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4
(1990).
Although the general Article 1 definition reads in full that "'Good faith' means hon-
esty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990), at least
two writers have suggested that the Article 1 definition only sets a threshold standard of
behavior and is not limited by definition solely to "honesty." See Bruce A. Campbell,
Contracts Jurisprudence and Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Allowa-
ble Scope of Future Advance and All Obligations Clauses in Commercial Security Agree-
ments, 37 Hastings L.J. 1007, 1036 (1986); Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra
note 10, at 383. These authors rely on comment 19 to § 1-201, which provides in part
that "'Good faith' . .. means at least [honesty in fact]." U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 19 (1990).
However, comment 19 reads in pertinent part as follows:
"Good faith", whenever it is used in the Code, means at least what is here
stated. In certain Articles, by specific provision, additional requirements are
made applicable .... To illustrate, in the Article on Sales, section 2-103, good
faith is expressly defined as including in the case of a merchant observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade, so that throughout
that Article wherever a merchant appears in the case an inquiry into his obser-
vance of such standards is necessary to determine his good faith.
Id. It is clear from comment 19, when read as a whole, that the words "at least" were
intended to mean that, although the general Code standard is honesty in fact, other arti-
cles and sections of the Code may expressly implement a higher standard. See United
States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1089 (Or. 1991). However, the phrase
"unless the context otherwise requires" which prefaces § 1-201 does provide support for
implying a higher standard of good faith with respect to other sections of the Code, even
in the absence of express language. See Richards Eng'rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031,
1032-33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (using language of preface to impose objective standard of
good faith).
46. U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2A-103(3), 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c), 4A-105(a)(6) (1990).
47. The "honesty in fact" standard applies to Article 9 (Secured Transactions), thus
making the scope of that standard arguably the issue in secured lending. Whether the
Code universally governs every aspect of lending transactions, however, is debatable.
While a separate security agreement in personal property or fixtures is clearly covered by
the Code, see U.C.C. § 9-102(1), (2) (1990), it is less than settled that a credit agreement
pursuant to which that security agreement was executed is governed by the Code rather
than the common law. See Proposed PEB Commentary, supra note 42, at n. 1 (Code
governs security agreement while common law governs credit agreement financial cove-
nants); see also Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (applying common
law to secured credit agreement); Components Direct, Inc. v. European Am. Bank &
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Some courts have adopted an entirely subjective standard for honesty in
fact,48 which looks "to the intent or state of mind of the party con-
cerned."49 Others have utilized an objective standard under which a
lender is required to observe reasonable commercial standards."° Still
others have relied on a "mixed" subjective and objective standard under
which honesty in fact, while ultimately a determination into an actor's
subjective state of mind, can be assessed through an examination of the
surrounding facts and circumstances. 5
The subjective/objective controversy most frequently arises under sec-
Trust Co., 572 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 1991) (same). In addition, real property secured
transactions are not governed by the Code. See U.C.C. § 9-104(j) & Cmt. 2 (1990).
48. See Adams v. First State Bank, 778 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Ark. 1989); Quest v. Bar-
nett Bank, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Jackson v. State Bank, 488
N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 1992); Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d
674, 678 (Iowa 1975); Daniels v. Army Nat'l Bank, 822 P.2d 39, 43 (Kan. 1991); Karner
v. Willis, 710 P.2d 21, 23 (Kan. 1985); Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d
196, 200 (Ky. 1964); Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 605 A.2d 609, 613 (Me.
1992); Sievert v. First Nat'l Bank, 358 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); United
States Nat'l Bank. v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1091 (Or. 1991); State Bank v. Woolsey, 565
P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977); Van Horn v. Van De Wol, Inc., 497 P.2d 252, 254 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1972); Niemuth v. Medford Nat'l Bank, 459 N.W.2d 259 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)
(unpublished opinion, text in Westlaw). However, in some cases a secured creditor may
be held to a higher standard of good faith even if a purely subjective standard is applied
to unsecured creditors. See Karner, 710 P.2d at 24 (Herd, J., dissenting) (secured credi-
tor should have higher burden); McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank of Clayton, 585
P.2d 325, 327 (N.M. Ct. App.) (reversing summary judgment for secured creditor), cerL
denied, 582 P.2d 1292 (N.M. 1978); Van Horn, 497 P.2d at 254 ("A secured creditor
must show more compelling facts because he is in a less precarious position than is an
unsecured creditor.").
49. United States Nat'l Bank v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1091 (Or. 1991) (quoting Com-
munity Bank v. Ell, 564 P.2d 685 (Or. 1977)).
50. See, e.g., Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1371 & n.2 (5th
Cir. 1969); Richards Eng'rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987);
Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620, 623-24 (Ind. C. App. 1975); Black v.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So. 2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983); Mitchell v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 45 (Okla. 1984); Richland Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Swenson, 816
P.2d 1045, 1051 (Mont. 1991); American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163,
172 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); see also James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 25-3, at 1192 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that drafters of Code intended an
objective standard). The parties nonetheless may adopt by agreement an objective stan-
dard in some jurisdictions. See Bartlett Bank & Trust Co. v. McJunkins, 497 N.E.2d 398,
404 (I1l. App. CL 1986).
51. See; e.g., Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1987); K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761 (6th Cir. 1985); Petra Int'l Banking Corp. v. First
Am. Bank of Va., 758 F. Supp. 1120, 1142 (E.D. Va. 1991); Martin Specialty Vehicles,
Inc. v. Bank of Boston (In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc.), 87 B.R. 752, 766 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1988) (applying Massachusetts law), rev'd on other grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D.
Mass. 1989); Watseka First Nat'l Bank v. Ruda, 552 N.E.2d 775, 781 (Ill. 1990); Tri-
Company Constr., Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, No. 64-872, 1991 Kan. App.
LEXIS 1, at *17-*18 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 1991); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank &
Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 533-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); J.R. Hale Contracting Co. v.
United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M. 1990); Canterbury Realty & Equip. Corp. v.
Poughkeepsie Say. Bank, 524 N.Y.S.2d 531, 536 (App. Div. 1988); Schaller v. Marine
Nat'l Bank, 388 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986); see also White & Summers, supra
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tion 1-208 of the Code when a lender seeks to accelerate a loan based on
an insecurity clause in the credit agreement. 52 A court adopting an ob-
jective standard for the Code's definition of good faith would require a
bank that accelerates a loan because of insecurity to have some objec-
tively reasonable basis to believe that the prospect of payment or per-
formance has become impaired. In contrast, under a subjective approach
the bank must merely act upon "an honest belief, based on whatever
information it has, that the ability of the debtor to repay the debt has in
some way become impaired."53
Conflicts have arisen not only with respect to the proper Code stan-
dard for the obligation of good faith but also with respect to the more
basic issue of when the obligation even applies in lending relationships.
The comment to section 1-208, which seems to exclude demand notes
from section 1-208,11 provides the principal point of contention. A grow-
ing majority of cases rely upon the comment to find that the Code does
not impose any obligation of good faith with respect to demand notes.55
note 50, § 25-3, at 1192 (honesty in fact standard "seems to lie somewhere between a
strict objective test (reasonable prudent man) and a thoroughly subjective one (whim)").
Some courts have chosen to avoid entirely the subjective/objective controversy. For
example, some Montana courts have defined "honesty in fact" under U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
as "faithfully carrying out the terms of the agreement." Coles Dep't Store v. First Bank
(N.A.), 783 P.2d 932, 935 (Mont. 1989); Shiplet v. First Sec. Bank, Inc., 762 P.2d 242,
246 (Mont. 1988). Good faith may also, in the words of one court, prohibit "objectively
oppressive and unfair" behavior. Martin Specialty Vehicles, 87 B.R. at 766. These defini-
tional turns place a common law gloss on the Code definition of good faith. See also
Watseka First Nat'l Bank, 552 N.E.2d at 781 (U.C.C. § 1-103, providing for incorpora-
tion of common law unless specifically displaced by Code, plays "a moderating influence"
on subjective standard for good faith). Similarly, other courts while applying the Code
seem to have incorporated the more flexible Restatement formulation of good faith as a
supplement to the U.C.C. § 1-203 obligation. Cf Bank of China v. Chan, 937 F.2d 780,
789 (2d Cir. 1991) (letter of credit case); United States v. H & S Realty Co., 837 F.2d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1987) (applying Restatement approach to Code standard). But see Boge, 814
P.2d at 1090 (statutory duty of good faith under Code displaces common law duty of
good faith).
52. Section 1-208 provides:
A term providing that one party ... may accelerate payment or performance or
require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or "when he deems himself
insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall
have the power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of
payment or performance is impaired.
U.C.C. § 1-208 (1990).
53. Watseka First Nat'l Bank, 552 N.E.2d at 779. Pre-Code cases appear to have
applied an objective standard for determining insecurity. See Feller v. McKillip, 81 S.W.
641, 643 (Kan. Ct. App. 1904).
54. The comment to § 1-208 states that the section "[o]bviously ... has no applica-
tion to demand instruments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any time
with or without reason." U.C.C. § 1-208 cmt. (1990).
55. See, e.g., Mirax Chem. Prod. Corp. v. First Interstate Commercial Corp., 950
F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1991); Greenberg v. Service Business Forms Indus., Inc., 882
F.2d 1538, 1540 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990); Citibank, N.A. v.
Field, No. 91-6290, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3621, at *16 (E.D. Pa. March 25, 1992);
Whitney Nat'l Bank v. J.E. Stack, No. 91-1320, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16877, at *9
(E.D. La. Nov. 15, 1991); Bankers Trust Co. v. F.D. Rich Co., No. 90 Civ. 4827, 1991
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Other courts take a more moderate approach and impose good faith limi-
tations on calling demand notes. 6 To avoid the issue of good faith limi-
tations on calling demand notes, many courts will find that the note at
issue, although expressly payable on demand, was in fact a term note
and, therefore, subject to the Code's general obligation of good faith.57
Section 1-208 also has generated divergent views regarding a lender's
exercise of its express right to accelerate upon a specified event of default
other than insecurity. The majority approach applies the general Code
obligation of good faith to such accelerations.58 In contrast, some courts
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14682, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1991); Taggart & Taggart Seed, Inc.
v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 230, 235 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d
1080 (8th Cir. 1989); Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81 B.R. 194, 199
(D. Mass. 1987); Power Equip. Co. v. First Ala. Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1297 (Ala. 1991);
Pavco Indus., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 534 So. 2d 572, 577 (Ala. 1988); Fleet Bank, N.A.
v. Czaplicki, No. PJR CV-91-0702261S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2553, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 1991); Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys., Inc. 485 So. 2d
1336, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc.,
269 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 605
A.2d 609, 613-14 (Me. 1992); Check Reporting Servs., Inc. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 478
N.W.2d 893, 898-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Centerre Bank, N.A. v. Distributors, Inc.,
705 S.W.2d 42, 47-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Simon v. New Hampshire Says. Bank, 296
A.2d 913, 915 (N.H. 1972); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank,
518 P.2d 734, 738 (Wash. Ct. App.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974)
56. See Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1987); K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1985); Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc. v.
Bank of Boston (In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc.), 87 B.R. 752, 765 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989); Richards Eng'rs, Inc.
v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1032 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Watseka First Nat'l Bank v. Ruda,
552 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ill. 1990); Van Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 124 (Ind. 1981);
Karner v. Willis, 700 P.2d 582, 583 (Kan. CL App. 1985); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's
Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 526 n.7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Motion for summary
judgment, First Fidelity Bank v. People Care, Inc., No. L-001554-90 (NJ. Super. Ct.
May 3, 1991); Canterbury Realty & Equip. Corp. v. Poughkeepsie Say. Bank, 524
N.Y.S.2d 531, 535 (App. Div. 1988); Clayton v. Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125,
1129 (Utah 1982); Van Horn v. Van De Wol, Inc., 497 P.2d 252, 254 (Wash. Ct. App.
1972).
57. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990). For example, the court in Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987), held that although the note at issue expressly seemed to give the
lender the right to demand immediate repayment, the presence of default terms in the
note limited the right to demand and thus the general obligation of good faith applied
irrespective of § 1-208. See id. at 13-14; see also Bank One, N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16,
31-32 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Reid); Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc. v. Bank of Boston
(In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc.), 87 B.R. 752, 765 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (using
Reid approach), rev'd on other grounds, 97 B.R1 721 (D. Mass. 1989); Shaughnessy v.
Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 951 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding no demand
note); Bottrell v. American Bank, 773 P.2d 694, 701 (Mont. 1989) (same). But see
Housatonic Bank & Trust Co. v. Jaser, No. CV90 03 34 88S, 1990 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1491, at *10 (Oct. 25, 1990) (contrary to Reid approach); Simon v. New Hampshire Says.
Bank, 296 A.2d 913, 915 (N.H. 1972) (same).
58. See; eg., Bank One, N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 32 (5th Cir. 1992); Reid v. Key
Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1987); Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 81 B.R. 194, 198-199 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that although no duty of good faith
under demand note, duty still applies to term note); Bank One, Cleveland, NA v. Grant-
ham, Inc., Nos. 90-6-1555, 90-6-1556, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4722, at *16-*17 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991), vacated, 588 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1992). Even if the general § 1-203 obligation
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use section 1-208 to find that no obligation of good faith exists even in
accelerating a term note upon a specified default within the control of the
debtor.59 Yet other courts rely upon section 1-208 to find that a lender's
acceleration upon a non-insecurity event of default must be based upon a
good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is
impaired.6
The limited scope of the Code, particularly as it governs banking ar-
rangements,61 makes the common law obligation of good faith, which is
recognized by a majority of jurisdictions, 62 applicable in lending disputes.
Unlike the Code, the Restatement does not attempt to define the meaning
of good faith and fair dealing, on the basis that the precise meaning of the
obligation will vary depending on the context in which it arises.63 The
Restatement views good faith as "emphasiz[ing] faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party" and "exclud[ing] a variety of types of conduct characterized
as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of de-
cency, fairness or reasonableness."' Comment d to section 205 provides
examples of conduct amounting to bad faith: "evasion of the spirit of the
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect
performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or
failure to cooperate in the other party's performance."6 The Restate-
ment thus sacrifices the definitional precision of the Code in favor of a
more open-ended approach.
The disparity between the Code and Restatement approaches to the
meaning of good faith might result in inconsistent determinations of a
applies, the remaining hurdle of what that section means, e.g., subjective honesty in fact
or otherwise, must be crossed. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
59. See Greenberg v. Service Business Forms Indus., 882 F.2d 1538, 1541 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990); Bowen v. Danna, 637 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Ark.
1982); Don Anderson Enters. v. Entertainment Enters., 589 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); Brummund v. First Nat'l Bank, 656 P.2d 884, 887-88 (N.M. 1983); Fay v. Marina,
Inc. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 516, 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Crockett v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 224 S.E.2d 580, 588 (N.C. 1976); Barker v. Agee, 378 S.E.2d
566, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); In re Sutton Investments, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 686, 690 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1980); see also Production Credit Ass'n v. Van Iperen, 396 N.W.2d 35, 39
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting as "irrelevant" evidence of bad faith in acceleration after
payment default).
60. See, eg., Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1979)
(due-on-lease clause); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Utah 1976) (late
payments).
61. See supra note 47.
62. See Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, at 369 & app.
63. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 205 cmt. d. The Restatement's approach to the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing relies significantly on Professor Summers' "excluder analysis" of the meaning
of good faith, discussed infra text accompanying notes 75-88. See id. § 205 cmt. a
("[Good faith] excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad
faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.");
see also Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 24, at 818-21.
[Vol. 61
1993] LENDER LIABILITY GOOD FAITH LITIGATION 977
party's good faith depending on whether or not the transaction at issue is
covered by the Code. A lender acting pursuant to a secured loan agree-
ment,66 for example, may be limited only by the subjective "honesty in
fact" standard of the Code.67 In contrast, a court could 68 apply the
broader Restatement principles to assess a lender's good faith under an
unsecured credit agreement providing for non-negotiable promissory
notes.69 Curiously, this outcome is inconsistent with the transactional
structure of lending arrangements.7 0  A secured lender exercises far
greater leverage and control over a borrower than an unsecured lender
by virtue of the secured lender's security interest in assets of the bor-
rower.71 One therefore would expect that, because of this control, a se-
cured lender's obligation of good faith would be measured by at least the
same standard as that applied to an unsecured lender, if not a higher
standard.72 Application of the Code and the Restatement, however,
leads to the opposite result-the secured lender's duty can be governed
by the more lenient "honesty in fact" standard of the Code.
66. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203 (general obligation of good faith), 9-102 (1990) (Article 9
applies to secured transactions).
67. See generally cases cited supra note 48.
68. Some jurisdictions, however, have simply refused to recognize a cause of action
based upon an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in lending agreements.
See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Sasson, 786 F. Supp. 349, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying
Michigan law); Power Equip. Co., Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1297 (Ala.
1991) (discussing Alabama precedent); Security Bank v. Dalton, 803 S.W.2d 443, 449
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that good faith is required only in a special relationship);
see also Capri Jewelry, Inc. v. Chayavi, 503 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(Code provisions on good faith and unconscionability generally concern sales contracts,
not negotiable instruments).
69. See U.C.C. §§ 3-102(a) (application of Article 3), 3-104(a) (1990) (requirements
for negotiability).
70. Given that the recent revisions to Articles 3 and 4 of the Code incorporate the
broader U.C.C. definition of good faith-reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing-the "honesty in fact" definition appears to be on the wane, with Article 9 being the
only major Article of the Code still using the definition. The § 1-201 definition of "hon-
esty in fact" was included because of bank lobby concerns over too broad a duty of good
faith under Article 3 holder in due course provisions. See Robert Braucher, The Legisla-
tive History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 813 (1958); see also
U.C.C. § 3-302 (1990) (holder in due course provisions). Because the 1990 revisions to
Articles 3 and 4 reject the principal justification for the drafter's inclusion of the "honesty
in fact" definition in § 1-201(19), the value of the definition as applied to Article 9 has
been further undermined. Cf Patterson, Wittigenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at
382-83 (application of § 1-201(19) definition to Article 9 good faith questionable).
However, not all jurisdictions have adopted the objective standard for good faith when
enacting the revised versions of Articles 3 and 4. See, eg., 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1823,
at 1824, 1852 (West) (not enacting objective good faith provisions).
71. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 10, at 568-74 (discussing role of security interest);
William H. Lawrence, Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with
Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1399
(1989) (control arising from blanket security interest); Robert E. Scott, A Relational The-
ory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 932-33 (1986) (same).
72. Perhaps in recognition of this problem, some courts, in interpreting the Code
definition of "honesty in fact," have implemented a higher, less subjective standard of
good faith in the case of secured creditors. See supra note 48.
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B. Current Theories of Good Faith
Largely in response to the conflicting Code and Restatement stan-
dards, conceptualizing and defining an operational standard for when a
contract has been performed or enforced in good faith has been the sub-
ject of extensive commentary. 73 A consensus may be drawn that the obli-
gation of good faith serves to protect the "reasonable expectations of the
parties."'74 Four principal arguments have arisen in attempting to pro-
vide some content to this vague standard, each of which differs as to
conceptualization and implementation.
1. Contractual Morality
There have been assertions that it is impossible to define independently
the meaning of good faith, as the Code attempts. This argument is based
on the contention that:
good faith is an "excluder." It is a phrase without general meaning (or
meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide range of heteroge-
nous forms of bad faith. In a particular context the phrase takes on
specific meaning but usually this is only by way of contrast with the
specific form of bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled out.7s
According to this view, the obligation of good faith not only serves gen-
erally to exclude particular forms of misconduct and facilitate "contrac-
tual morality"76 in transactions, but also, more specifically, to preclude
"misconduct which is neither fraudulent nor negligent."' 77 Additionally,
73. See generally sources cited supra note 24.
74. See Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, at 387; Patterson, Wittgen-
stein and the Code, supra note 10, at 384; Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law, supra note 24, at 263; Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 24,
at 832.
75. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law, supra note 24, at 201. Sum-
mers' work provided the basis for the Restatement's provision on good faith and fair
dealing. See supra note 65. Dennis Patterson recently has argued that Summers has
misapplied J.L. Austin's argument on excluders. The core of Patterson's objection to
Summers' views is that "good faith" cannot be applied to Austin's view of excluders:
If "good faith" were an excluder, it would have meaning only in relation to
other legal concepts, but in Summers' analysis, it does not. Consider the
following:
Real (Good faith) Duck (Variant meanings of bad faith)
In order for the excluder analysis to work with a concept like good faith, Sum-
mers needs an analogue to the excluder term "real" in "real duck." He does
not supply one. Instead, he claims that good faith "takes on specific and variant
meanings by way of contrast with the specific and variant forms of bad faith
which judges decide to prohibit." But this simply will not work: there must be
some concept (a substantive) upon which good faith is parasitic in just the way
that "real" is parasitic on "duck." It makes no more sense to say that "good
faith" is the opposite of "bad faith" than it does to say that a decoy is the
"opposite" of a real duck. But that is precisely the claim that Summers makes.
Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at 349-50 (citations omitted). For a
discussion of Patterson's view on good faith, see infra text accompanying notes 105-15.
76. See Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 24, at 811.
77. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law, supra note 24, at 199.
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good faith "enforce[s] the unspecified 'inner logic' of a deal," ' and "pre-
vent[s] the abuse of powers conferred by contract. ' 79 The obligation
therefore acts to impose separate moral standards for conduct in relation
to the parties' agreement and may act to override the express terms of
that agreement.8 0
This excluder approach to good faith contends that it is impossible for
either courts or parties to a contract to know in advance whether particu-
lar conduct constitutes good faith. The approach denies the possibility
that good faith has a "single, positive, and unified general meaning.""1
The scope of the obligation can only decisively be determined in court,
where the judge (who must first "appreciate[ the implications of the ex-
cluder analysis"82) uses analogy to and deduction from precedent to
reach a conclusion as to whether the conduct in the case at bar consti-
tutes "bad faith."83
Courts and transactors are not entirely without guidance in assessing
whether particular conduct constitutes extracontractual "bad faith." In
addition to the criteria mentioned in the comment to the Restatement's
obligation of good faith and fair dealing," three subsidiary areas of
"good faith law" exist. First, there is a "vast accumulation of holdings
with stated reasons" assessing the bad faith vel non of particular con-
duct. Second, there are compilations of generalized "lists of criteria"
for identifying specific forms of bad faith conduct.86 Finally, "the ac-
cumulation of experience with respect to some contexts might be specifi-
cally extensive, and the circumstantial attributes of these contexts
sufficiently amenable, to permit the formulation of detailed rules that rule
out specific forms of bad faith.",87 These three areas of "good faith law,"
together with the Restatement provision imposing an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing and the comments thereto, protect against the
strongest criticism raised against excluder analysis-that it provides little
assistance to judges in cases involving conduct not clearly covered by
"good faith law" and invites judicial inconsistency. 8
78. Id.
79. Id For other types of bad faith conduct under this view, see supra text accompa-
nying note 65 (Restatement provisions).
80. See, e.g., id at 234-35 (acting to "evade the spirit of the deal" may override the
agreement).
81. Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 24, at 820.
82. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law, supra note 24, at 206.
83. See id at 206-07.
84. See supra text accompanying note 65.
85. Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 24, at 822 (emphasis
omitted).
86. See id (emphasis omitted).
87. Id
88. Id at 823; see Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, at 369-70 ("The
good faith performance doctrine consequently appears as a license for the exercise of
judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable and inconsistent appli-
cations."); Gillette, supra note 24, at 650 ("Summers' advocacy of good faith as a means
for excluding certain conduct from acceptable commercial behavior appears to be predi-
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2. Agreement/Interpretivist
Other theories reject the view that the obligation of good faith should
impose requirements of contractual morality upon transactors. 89 Instead
they view good faith as a doctrine that facilitates, rather than hinders,
enforcement of the parties' agreement. Consensus exists, however, that a
court should enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties.90 The
agreement/interpretivist approaches differ primarily with respect to the
interpretive bounds of the parties' legally enforceable agreement.
a. "'Reasons Available" Interpretive Approach
One interpretivist approach begins with the construction of a "mul-
tifaceted expectation interest" which dictates what "reasonable expecta-
tions" of the parties the good faith doctrine should protect.9 ' As a
matter of general contract interpretation, "[w]hen the express terms of a
contract do not obviously resolve the difficulty, the best response is to
embed the dispute in its proper context and to seek guidance for its reso-
lution by interpretation with continued sensitivity to the intentions of the
parties and their reasonable expectations." 92 A promisee's expectation
interest includes both the subject matter to be received under the con-
tract and the anticipated costs of performance by the other party.93 This
perspective on the expectation interest leads to the conclusion that good
faith behavior "depends on the reasons available to justify the action
under the circumstances, "91 which reasons are "grounded in the world
represented by the contract as made by the parties."95 Recognition that
the expectation interest encompasses or precludes certain reasons for ac-
tion 96 suggests the implementation of two interpretive standards for good
cated on the ability of and desirability for judges to make ad hoc determinations of
whether permitting specific commercial conduct would be 'just.' "); Patterson, Wittgen-
stein and the Code, supra note 10, at 350-51 ("The flaw in Summers' analysis is that he
believes that the excluder analysis provides judges with sufficient material from which to
fashion analogies between old and new instances of bad faith.").
89. See Burton, Reply, supra note 24, at 499-500.
90. See, e.g., Burton & Andersen, supra note 24, at 862-63; Burton, Reply, supra note
24, at 499; Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at 384.
91. Burton & Andersen, supra note 24, at 867.
92. Id. at 866.
93. See Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, at 387.
94. Burton & Andersen, supra note 24, at 867.
95. Id.
96. Initially it seemed that only certain economic reasons for action were excluded.
See, e.g., Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, at 387 n.80 ("Noneconomic
factors so rarely are evidenced in the reported cases, however, that the focus of the theory
must be on economic motives."). However, acting for noneconomic motives "are likely
to run afoul of the good faith performance doctrine .... " See id.; see also Burton, Racial
Discrimination in Contract Performance, supra note 24, at 451-54 ("abusive practices"
and racial discrimination impermissible reasons). In lending cases, courts allude to non-
economic factors which might bear on the reasons for the lender's behavior. See, e.g.,
Reid v. Key Bank, Inc. 821 F.2d 9, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1987) (allegations that lender's actions
were racially motivated); Quality Automotive Co. v. Signet Bank, 775 F. Supp. 849, 853
(D. Md. 1991) (bank allegedly terminated line of credit because borrower had done busi-
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faith-one for performance 97 and one for enforcement.9 8
Bad faith performance occurs when a party exercises discretion to re-
capture a foregone opportunity.99 This may include acting for specific
reasons foregone upon contracting, thereby harming the non-discretion-
ary party's expectation interest."° The interpretive methodology for per-
formance, therefore, would be first to determine whether a particular
ness with competitor bank); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting,
97 B.R. 420, 422-23 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (bank decided it should not do business on
Chicago's South Side and "Debtor should go back to its own neighborhood"), vacated,
908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990); Ricci v. Key Bancshares, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1141
(D. Me. 1987) (discrimination on basis of national origin); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco,
674 P.2d 288, 290 (Alaska 1983) (in seizing collateral, banker "conducted himself with an
air of self-importance and appeared to be 'charged up' by the takeover"); Security Pac.
Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 262 Cal. Rptr. 260, 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (bank officer told
borrower, a former friend, that "he was closing the place down; and there was not a
'fucking thing' [the borrower] could do about it"); Karner v. Willis, 710 P.2d 21, 25
(Kan. 1985) (Herd, J., dissenting) (bank accelerated due to garnishment lien on un-
secured assets); Noonan v. First Bank, 740 P.2d 631, 636 (Mont. 1987) (Sheehy, J., dis-
senting) ("The president of the Bank became furious when he learned that the
[borrowers] had been borrowing money from other banks."); First Nat'l Mont. Bank v.
McGuiness, 705 P.2d 579, 581 (Mont. 1985) (bank suggested collateral be sold to bank
officer who was director's nephew); Security Bank v. Dalton, 803 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1991) (through bank officer's mistake, loans exceeded loans to one borrower
ratio).
97. See generally Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24.
98. See generally Andersen, supra note 24.
99. A party has "discretion" when it "has a legal power in effect to specify a term of
the contract during the performance stage of the contract," Burton, Racial Discrimina-
tion in Contract Performance, supra note 24, at 452; see also Burton, Common Law Good
Faith, supra note 24, at 380-85 (same), such as when the contract expressly allows one
party to dictate a term, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (1990) (price term), or as a result of"a
lack of clarity and completeness in the express terms, which may become apparent only
as events unfold after formation." Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Perform-
ance, supra note 24, at 452; see also Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, at
380 & n.44 (same).
Much of the analysis to date has focused solely upon the former type of discretion
rather than the latter. See generally Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24.
Another articulation of discretion provides that a "party enjoys discretion in the relevant
sense whenever the express terms of the contract do not specify that one party is entitled
to receive some particular benefit from the other party who, nonetheless, is under a con-
tractual duty of good faith." Burton & Andersen, supra note 24, at 868. Hence, the
notion of "discretion" in this context substitutes for what is commonly referred to as
"gaps" with the "foregone opportunities" analysis being used to fill the gap. Some inter-
pretive problems remain as yet unresolved with respect to the concept of "discretion" as
it applies to lending agreements. For example, if a loan agreement provides that "the
Borrower shall not sell any collateral without the Lender's written consent," is the
Lender's right "discretionary" or absolute? See Quintana v. First Interstate Bank, 737
P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (mortgagee's consent not limited by good faith). If
absolute, it follows that the lender in that case may withhold consent for any reason or no
reason at all, a view in which this Article concurs. However, some courts have found a
lender's refusal to lend under the terms of a credit agreement to be a "discretionary"
event. See Richland Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swenson, 816 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Mont.
1991).
100. See Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, at 385-86. The test is both
subjective and objective, in that it demands (i) a subjective inquiry in the determination of
the purpose in the discretion-exercising party's purpose in acting and (ii) an objective
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party used "discretion" and, second, whether that discretion was exer-
cised to recapture an opportunity foregone upon contracting.
Recognizing the distinction made in the Code and the Restatement
between good faith performance and enforcement,10' a separate analysis
under this approach applies with respect to exercise of an "enforcement
term" in an agreement. Good faith in the enforcement of a contract oc-
curs if, under the circumstances existing at the time enforcement is
sought, invocation of an enforcement term would primarily advance the
purposes for which it was included in the agreement without imposing
needless costs on the non-enforcing party. 10 2 The sometimes extremely
difficult 0 3 determination of whether a contract term is an "enforcement
term" or a "performance term," which is crucial for determining which
standard of good faith applies, focuses upon whether the term assures
due performance through the power to change the legal relationship of
the parties."'" If an enforcement term is involved, further analysis is
required to determine whether enforcement would primarily serve the
purposes for which the term was included in the agreement (necessitating
inquiry as to whether the purpose was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties
at the time of contract formation. See id. at 386.
101. See supra notes 42-43. The Code originally limited the obligation of good faith to
"performance" of contracts within the Code See Braucher, supra note 70, at 813. The
obligation of good faith in "enforcement" of contracts arose from a concern that Article 2
of the Code failed to provide adequate protection to a defaulting buyer when the seller
failed to mitigate damages. See id.; 1951 ABA Section Report 162, 195-96.
102. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 306, 312. The test seeks to balance the principle
of fulfilling expectations with that of mitigation of damages. See id. at 306.
103. See, e.g., id. at 302 (stating that in many cases "it may not be obvious when
performance ends and enforcement begins"); Burton & Andersen, supra note 24, at 874
(stating that distinguishing between performance and enforcement may be difficult).
104. Andersen, supra note 24, at 304. Again, interpretive difficulties arise here, per-
haps if only because the terminology is grounded in the language of sales transactions
rather than lending transactions. A "performance term" "take[s] the form of an express
or implied promise that an event shall occur, failing which the promisor will be liable for
breach unless excused or discharged." Id. Initially, then, it appears that affirmative and
negative covenants in a credit agreement would be performance terms. However, a
lender's acceleration after failure of the borrower to comply with a specified affirmative or
negative covenant would constitute invocation of an enforcement term. See id. at 342-45.
Under this view a lender may only accelerate when it would advance the interests that the
enforcement term (exercised in light of the specified event of default) is intended to pro-
tect. Arguably, though, since the interest which any lender has upon acceleration after a
specified event of default is only preservation of security or protecting an impaired pros-
pect of payment, this approach would adopt the holding of Brown v. AVEMCO Inv.
Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), which has been argued to be inconsistent with the
textual language of U.C.C. § 1-208. See Snyderman, Comment, supra note 10, at 1357-59
(discussing Brown and § 1-208); see also supra text accompanying notes 52-60 (divergent
views on § 1-208). If this is so, the approach attempts to implement a doctrine of sub-
stantial performance of covenants into lending transactions. If a provision in the agree-
ment that conditions the lender's obligation to lend upon the absence of an event of
default would also constitute an enforcement term (a "power to change the legal relation-
ship"), under this view the lender would have a duty to lend if the conditions were sub-
stantially performed. But see Richland Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swenson, 816 P.2d
1045, 1052 (Mont. 1991) (refusal to lend is discretionary).
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an examination of the enforcer's reasons for acting) and to assess the
costs imposed by enforcement.
b. "Deeply" Interpretive Approach
The deeply interpretive approach to good faith focuses specifically on
lender liability cases governed by the Code.1"5 Employing a purposive
methodology for determining the meaning of good faith under Article 9
of the Code,1"s this approach seeks to justify incorporation of the Re-
statement's standard of good faith and fair dealing'07 into the Code as a
means to "create[ ] new possibilities for answering the question of what
good faith means in a given context."'08 The reconstructed Code provi-
sions on good faith lead to the conclusion that "the justified expectations
of the parties become a test of the good faith of each. ' ' 1°9 In addition to
protecting justified expectations of the parties, the Restatement incorpo-
rates into the Code community standards of decency, fairness, and rea-
sonableness as subsidiary purposes for the good faith doctrine." 0
The expanded definition of good faith under the deeply interpretive
view acts in relation to the expansive Code definition of "agreement.""'
Advocating a deeply interpretive role for the courts in determining the
meaning of "agreement" and good faith principally from the borrower's
perspective,' 1 2 this approach asserts that "[n]o litmus test exists for as-
certaining what, in all cases, will constitute the 'reasonable' expectations
105. See generally Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10; see also gener-
ally Patterson, Easterbrook on Good Faith, supra note 10; Patterson, Good Faith, Lender
Liability, supra note 10. Patterson's views on good faith in the area of lender liability are
synthesized in Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability (1990) [hereinafter
Patterson, Good Faith].
106. See Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at 370-73.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
108. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at 384, 394. But see United
States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Or. 1991) (concluding that the
Code displaces the Restatement definition). Other theories suggest that the Code provi-
sions on good faith are largely irreconcilable with the common-law standards. See, eg.,
Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 24, at 22-24 (suggesting revision of Code defini-
tion); Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 24, at 215 (criticizing
Code approach).
109. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at 384.
110. See id. at 385-86. The relevant community is the "financial community" and
reasonable conduct is that being consistent with similarly situated lenders. See id.
111. See id. at 403-07; Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, supra note 10, at 185-
202; Patterson, Easterbrook on Good Faith, supra note 10, at 513. The Code specifically
states that one acts in good faith relative to an "agreement." See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
An "agreement," under the Code, "means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or
usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act (sections 1-205 and 2-
208)." U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1990). Although open to question, "course of performance"
specifically applies only to transactions falling within Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-208 (1990);
see Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at 416-17.
112. See Patterson, Good Faith, supra note 105, at 144 ("real question is what it was
reasonable for the debtor to believe vis-A-vis its 'Agreement' ").
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of the debtor."'113 Rather, only "parameters" for judicial determination
of the good faith of the parties can be set." 4 The Code's command that
courts perform this interpretive role overrides any countervailing social,
economic, or institutional concerns." 5
113. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 10, at 421, 425 ("[I]t is difficult,
if not impossible, to state in advance when and under what conditions courts should
refrain from enforcing anti-waiver clauses.").
114. See id. at 422; Patterson, Good Faith, supra note 105, at 193-95. In the context of
the enforceability of anti-waiver clauses, the following considerations arise under the
deeply interpretive approach:
1. Was there anything in the circumstances that would put the debtor on
notice that the secured party would not refrain from exercising its rights upon
default?
2. Did the secured party ever tell the debtor it believed her to be in default?
3. Did the debtor have any prior credit experiences that would have alerted
her to the fact that failure to pay on time (as opposed to failure to pay at all)
exposed her property to the risk of repossession without prior notice?
4. Did the secured party ever notify the debtor that late payments were a
breach of the security agreement?
5. Was the anti-waiver clause a negotiated term of the security agreement?
6. Did the secured party's loan officer ever bring the anti-waiver clause to
the debtor's attention?
7. Is the debtor sufficiently experienced (sophisticated) in credit matters to
know that late payments are an indulgence on the part of the secured creditor
and not a waiver of any written terms of the security agreement?
8. Did the secured party ever afford the debtor the opportunity to obtain
credit elsewhere before moving against the collateral?
9. Is the debtor more than one or two payments in arrears?
Patterson, Good Faith, supra note 105, at 193-95. Even if "[a]rguments over meaning are
not reducible to questions of Pareto optimality, wealth maximization or efficiency," id. at
155, nonetheless the deeply interpretive approach has both social effects on relationships
not yet in dispute and economic effects on lending transactions subsequent to any particu-
lar decision. For example, a lender wishing to act in good faith under the above parame-
ters might be advised to: (1) enforce rights immediately, (2) immediately give notice of
default, (3) refuse to lend to (or charge higher interest rates on loans to) parties with poor
credit histories, (4) send immediate written notices of default, (5,6) have clauses initialled
and in conspicuous language, (7) refuse to lend to (or charge higher interest rates on
loans to) unsophisticated borrowers, (8) allow time for refinancing (which is inconsistent
with (1) and (9)), and (9) enforce rights immediately.
115. See Patterson, Good Faith, supra note 105, at 155; Patterson, Wittgenstein and
the Code, supra note 10, at 393 (purposive, interpretive approach "affords judges the
opportunity to engage in substantive, normative construction"). Some jurists would
strongly disagree:
The intrusion of courts into every aspect of life, and particularly into every type
of business relationship, generates serious costs and uncertainties, trivializes the
law, and denies individuals and businesses the autonomy of adjusting mutual
rights and responsibilities through voluntary contractual arrangements.
.... [A test of] whether conduct "offends accepted notions of business eth-
ics".., gives judges license to rely on their gut feelings in distinguishing be-
tween a squabble and [the tort of bad faith denial of a contract]. As a result,
both the commercial world and the courts are needlessly burdened: The parties
are hamstrung in developing binding agreements by the absence of clear legal
principles; overburdened courts must adjudicate disputes that are incapable of
settlement because no one can predict how-or even by what standard-they
will be decided.
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3. Relational Contract Theory
In contrast to neoclassical contract theory, relational contract the-
ory1" 6 lacks a comprehensive description of the obligation of good
faith.117 According to relational theory, classical and neoclassical
contract law express a transactional view of exchange premised on the
notion that contracts are "discrete," separate from prior, contemporane-
ous, and subsequent events." 8 Although discrete transactions do exist in
Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
116. References to "relational contract" and "relational contract theory" largely are to
the relational contract theories of Ian Macneil and others. Relational contract ideas are
also employed by Professors Goetz and Scott. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981). Although the question of
who "invented" relational contract is an open issue, see Ian R. Macneil, Relational Con-
tract What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 483, 483; Robert E. Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2009 n.9 (1987),
the two schools of relational theory have different focal points. The Goetz and Scott
approach employs the relational idea of gaps in contracts, see infra text accompanying
notes 127-31, as a basis for economic analysis of incomplete contracting. See Goetz &
Scott, supra, at 1091 ("A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable
of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations."). Macneil
and others, on the other hand, present and employ a broader sociological theory of con-
tract that is not based merely upon the existence of gaps in contracts. To some extent,
though, Macneil's relational approach and the law and economics relational approach are
beginning to coalesce. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analy-
sis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271,275-78 (1992).
For discussions of the distinctions between the two types of relational contract theory, see
Macneil, supra, at 496; G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common
Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1198,
1205 n.38 (1988).
117. For applications of relational contract theory to other areas of law, see Patricia A.
Brown & Jay M. Feinman, Economic Loss, Commercial Practices, and Legal Process:
Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 22 Rutgers L.J. 301, 348-59 (1991)
(availability of tort actions for economic loss); Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations"
Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 955-70 (1990)
(franchises); Roderick W. Macneil, Contract in China Law, Practice, and Dispute Reso-
lution, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 303, 366-89 (1986) (Chinese contract law); Richard E. Speidel,
Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev.
369, 400-04 (1981) (price adjustments under sales contracts) [hereinafter Price Adjust-
ments]; Richard E. Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contracts: Some
Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C. L. Rev. 241 (1980) (nonperformance in long-
term contracts). See generally Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing Re-
lationships, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 461, 483-622 (1985).
118. See Ian R Macneil, The New Social Contract 60 (1980); Ian R. Macneil, The
Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691, 693 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil, Many
Futures]. Discrete transactions are characterized by their (1) short duration, (2) limited
personal interaction, (3) easy, precise measurement of objects of exchange, (4) require-
ment of only a minimum of future cooperation between the parties, (5) failure to require
benefit or burden sharing, and (6) lack of an expectation of altruistic behavior by the
parties to the contract. See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentiation, 60 Va. L. Rev. 589, 594 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil, Presentiation]. Be-
cause even the most discrete of exchanges occurs within contractual relations, all ex-
changes are "relational" in one sense. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as
Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. Institutional & Theoreti-
cal Econ. 272, 276 (1987) [hereinafter Macneil, Reply]. Thus, an exchange exhibiting
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fact, relational contract theory denies that all exchanges are discrete." 19
For example, parties may enter into long-term business arrangements or
may have extensive prior dealings. Relational theory, therefore, rejects
the reliance that more traditional consent 120 or agreement-based theories
place upon principles such as freedom of contract and exercise of choice.
According to relational theory, those principles
can never be the absolutes they tend to be in a system of discrete trans-
actional law. They can prevail only so long as they sufficiently avoid
conflict with other normative principles, else the relation will fall
apart. In relational contract law there is thus always a preliminary
question about party allocations of power: How do they fit with the
remainder of the relation? 12
1
In lieu of the traditional focus upon consent, relational contract theory
substitutes a complex system of norms reflecting actual contractual be-
havior, and establishing normative principles of appropriate contractual
behavior. 122 Common contract norms apply to all contracting behavior, 123
more relational characteristics is perhaps more appropriately called an "intertwined ex-
change." See id. In addition, an individual exchange relation may have highly discrete
and/or highly intertwined facets. See id. at 277. For a chart fully depicting the attributes
of the intertwined (relational) and discrete (transactional) poles of exchange, see Macneil,
Many Futures, supra, at 738-40; Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 854, 902-05 [hereinafter Macneil, Adjustment of Long-Term Relations].
119. See, e.g., Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50
U. Chi. L. Rev. 567, 569 (1983) ("Emphasis on discrete transactions abstracted from the
ongoing relationships in which they occur distorts the character of the transactions and
of the relationships themselves.").
120. Professor Randy Barnett argues that Macneil's treatment of the bounds of con-
sent often is inconsistent, and in many respects comports with Barnett's own consent
theory of contract. See generally Barnett, supra note 34, at 1182-94.
121. Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract 86 (1980).
122. See id. at 37-39.
123. For full discussions of common contract norms, see Macneil, supra note 121, at
40-59; Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev.
340, 347-66 (1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract]. The norms common to any
contract are (1) implementation of planning, which encompasses both the planning of the
performance of the exchange and the structuring of operating relations within the
exchange, see Macneil, supra note 121, at 47; (2) effectuation of consent, which, based
upon the parties' exercise of choice, is distinct from the more extensive effectuation of
planning, see id. at 48-50; (3) restitution, reliance, and expectation, see id. at 52-53; (4)
role integrity, which encompasses a pattern of expected behavior, see id. at 40-44; (5)
reciprocity, "the principle of getting something back for something given," Macneil,
Values in Contract, supra, at 347; (6) flexibility, which conflicts with the norms of
implementation of planning and effectuation of consent and differs when operating within
discrete and relational exchanges, see Macneil, supra note 121, at 50; (7) contractual
solidarity, the common belief "in effective future interdependence," id. at 91, and the
equivalent of trust, see Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
Shortfall and the Need for a "'Rich Classificatory Apparatus", 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1018,
1047 (1981); (8) creation and restraint of power resulting from the interplay of the other
norms in successful contractual relations, see Macneil, supra note 121, at 56-57; (9)
propriety of means, which connotes principles of procedural justice, see Macneil, Values
in Contract, supra, at 347; and (10) harmonization with the social matrix, which requires
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while discrete 24 and relational' 25 contract norms apply to discrete and
more relational contracting, respectively. Yet, the extent and method by
which this normative structure is intended to provide a framework for
judicial dispute resolution has not been entirely resolved. 126
Relational contract theory's emphasis on the relational qualities of ex-
change parallels closely, in one respect, the current academic literature
recognizing "gaps" in contracting.127 As an exchange exhibits more rela-
tional characteristics, the parties' ability to "presentiate," that is, to bring
the future into the present effectively and thereby deal with the future as
though it were the present, deteriorates. 128  Since the parties are unable
to take into account elements they are unable to presentiate, this deterio-
at least partial incorporation of societal norms as internal norms of the contract, see
Macneil, supra note 121, at 58.
124. The common contract norms of implementation of planning and effectuation of
consent intensify and merge in discrete transactions. The result is a "discrete norm" of
enhancing discreteness and presentiation. See Macneil, supra note 121, at 59-60. The
remaining eight common norms discussed above are reduced in the context of discrete
transactions to providing a backdrop for the implementation of the discrete norm, see
Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 123, at 360-61, reinforcing its operation rather
than promoting values independent of discreteness and presentiation. See id.
125. When an exchange exhibits more relational characteristics the common contract
norms of role integrity, contractual solidarity, and harmonization of the social relation
intensify. See generally Macneil, supra note 121, at 66-70. This results in the emergence
of relational contract norms of intensified role integrity, preservation of the relation (an
enhancement of the common norm of contractual solidarity), and harmonization of rela-
tional conflict, propriety of means, and supracontractual norms, such as liberty and dig-
nity. See id.; Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 123, at 350.
126. See Barnett, supra note 34, at 1178-79 (stating that norms are critical), 1190-94
(discussing the limitations of relational theory in contract enforcement). Macneil himself
rejects the notion that positive law should reflect, or has progressed toward, the relational
pole of contracting at the expense of discreteness. See Macneil, Reply, supra note 118, at
280-82. In Macneil's view, relational contract theory has shifted the starting point for the
determination of what contract law reinforces: "The 'progress' is towards law reinforcing
the calculating rationality of people within relations with high levels of discreteness of
various kinds, including discrete transactions, but always treating the discreteness as an
integral part of the relations subject to considerable regulation .... " Id. at 282.
127. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts" An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.L 87 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821 (1992); David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
Mich. L. Rev. 1815 (1991); Schwartz, supra note 116.
128. See Macneil, Adjustment of Long-Term Relations, supra note 118, at 863; Mac-
neil, supra note 121, at 60; see also Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 118, at 589
("Presentiation is thus a recognition that the course of the future is bound by present
events, and that by those events the future has for many purposes been brought effectively
into the present."). Complete promissory presentiation is impossible even in the most
discrete of exchanges. See Macneil, supra note 121, at 8. Promise-making is inherently
fragmentary due to the limits of the human mind and the inherent unknowability of the
future. See id. As developed more fully in the law and economics/incomplete con-
tracting literature, identified causes of incompleteness include (1) ambiguous language,
(2) oversight, (3) excessive costs of completion (which is largely coextensive with an im-
perfectly knowable future), (4) asymmetric information, and (5) a party's preference for
anonymity. See Schwartz, supra note 116, at 278-80; see also Barnett, supra note 127, at
821-22 (discussing causes of incompleteness); Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 118, at
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ration results in gaps in planning. 129 For example, contracting parties
might fail to include an express term in a long-term, relational contract
because they are unable to perceive of a future event that would render
that term transactionally necessary. 130 Moreover, "gaps" may exist even
with respect to express terms in the agreement. An express term in-
tended to handle a potential future issue is presentiated only with respect
to that future capable of being brought into the present at the time of
planning ("Future A"). To the extent that Future A fails to occur, and
instead "Future B" occurs, there is a gap in the term with respect to its
scope as applied to Future B. 13 1
If relational contract theory is intended not only to be critical but also
to provide a foundation for judicial gap-filling, it has not succeeded in
advancing a satisfactory response. One application of relational theory
might provide that a judge should apply "norms that transcend the rela-
tionship" (an external approach). 132 Yet, what those transcendent norms
should require as a matter of legal rules is problematic. For example,
what behavior does a relational norm such as "solidarity" proscribe-or
prescribe-at the level of legal rules? 133
Alternatively, one could refer to the parties' relationship itself to deter-
mine the substantive content of the norms (an internal approach).134
This approach, however, also presents difficulties. 135 Professor Schwartz,
for example, critiques two possible internal approaches: first, viewing
731 (discussing limitations of promise-making). These obstacles affect promises in even
the most discrete exchanges.
129. See Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 118, at 761-63; see also E. Allan Farns-
worth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 860, 868-73 (1968) (dis-
cussing gaps in contracts).
130. This type of gap may be the result of either a failure to foresee the foreseeable
(human error) or the result of the occurrence of an event unforeseeable at the time of
contracting (fate). See Farnsworth, supra note 129, at 871; see also Schwartz, supra note
116, at 278-80 (incompleteness resulting from oversight or imperfectly knowable future).
131. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 127, at 92 n.29 (discussing gap arising
when "parties' duties are fully specified, but the contracts are incomplete because those
specified duties are not tailored to economically relevant future events"); Charles J. Goetz
& Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Be-
tween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 267-72 (1985) (discuss-
ing formulation errors in contract drafting); Schwartz, supra note 116, at 272 (defining
contracts that "partition[ future states or potential contracting partners 'too coarsely'"
as incomplete).
132. Schwartz, supra note 116, at 275. Under this view, "judges should be guided by
society's sense of what is fair, distributionally just, and adequately participatory." Id.
Professor Schwartz coined the distinction between "external" and "internal" relational
approaches. See id. at 275-76.
133. See id. at 275-76.
134. See id. at 275.
135. See id. at 275-77. Even relational contract writers concede the difficulties arising
from relational interpretation in the courts. See, e.g., Brown & Feinman, supra note 117,
at 358 ("[R]elational analysis can be cumbersome and time consuming."); Hadfield, supra
note 117, at 987 ("There are no hard-and-fast rules for [determining the scope of the
relationship]. Relational interpretation is a fact-specific exercise of attention, insight and
judgment.").
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"contractual relationships as little societies in which values evolve over
time" and, second, basing "decisional criteria on what parties probably
expect of each other."' 3 6 In Schwartz's view, the former approach suf-
fers from the same problems as the external approach due to the impossi-
bility of generating a set of rich, definable norms in otherwise thin
commercial transactions. 3 1 Even if such norms could be generated,,3"
because they are external to the parties' relationship, this internal ap-
proach becomes the functional equivalent of the external approach. 139
Because most contracting parties would prefer an efficient rule, the latter
internal approach (what parties probably would expect of each other),
according to Schwartz, collapses into the law-and-economics
approach.140
Good faith, perhaps even over other contract doctrines, has been her-
alded by relational contract theorists as a potent doctrine through which
courts may bring relational contract theory into practice.' 4 ' How the
relational potential of good faith is made manifest is, however, a matter
of debate. First, it has been argued that good faith, "a circumstance-
136. Schwartz, supra note 116, at 276.
137. See id
138. For example, while the set "Commercial Relationships" may fail to yield norms
that apply richly and predictably over a broad range of commercial relationships, nar-
rowing the set to subsets of "Lending Relationships" or "Franchise Relationships" may
in fact generate a richer set of norms applying to those relationships. See id
139. See id
140. See id at 276-77. The "probable expectations" internal approach, though, does
not necessarily collapse that easily into the law-and-economics approach. Professor
Schwartz acknowledges that, if the parties contemplated that their relationship would be
governed by norms other than those derived from efficiency, application of the law and
economics approach would contravene the parties' probable expectations. See id at 276
n.8. Presumably, therefore, if the parties have signalled their intent not to be governed by
a rule derived from efficiency, a court could imply rules not derived from a norm of
efficiency. For a discussion of the problems of signalling in the area of lender liability, see
generally Gillette, supra note 10, at 565-74.
141. For discussions of the relational underpinnings of good faith, see Hadfield, supra
note 117, at 984-86 ("The doctrinal tool necessary to bring the resolution of franchise
contract disputes into line with the realities of the franchise relation is the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing."); Peter Linzer, Uncontracm Context, Contorts and the Rela-
tional Approach, 1988 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 139, 176-77; Macneil, Adjustment of Long-
Term Relations, supra note 118, at 868-869; Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 118, at
604; Macneil, supra note 116, at 521-22; Reiter, supra note 24, at 725-29; Richard E.
Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & Com. 193, 201-02 (1982).
Two other theories of good faith discussed above are, in a sense, "relational" theories
of contract. Professor Summers' excluder approach to good faith which imposes princi-
ples of contractual morality in the performance of the parties' agreement, see supra notes
75-88 and accompanying text, tracks an external relational approach to good faith. Simi-
larly, Professor Patterson's deeply interpretivist approach to good faith which relies upon
a broad interpretation of the parties' agreement and incorporates into the obligation of
good faith community standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness, see supra text
accompanying notes 105-15, follows closely an internal relational approach to good faith.
Although, unlike the excluder approach to good faith, the deeply interpretivist approach
is grounded in a consent theory of contract, consent theories are not entirely irreconcila-
ble with relational contract theory. See Barnett, supra note 34, at 1179.
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bound concept that will, in many cases, be reducible to notions of fair-
ness and reasonableness in the circumstances," 142 is itself an independent
common contract norm.14
3
In contrast, Ian Macneil rejects an independent role for good faith as a
relational contract norm. He argues that "the essence of good faith in
any society is adherence to the common contract norms."' 44 Under this
view, meeting the common contract norms would constitute good faith,
whereas failing to meet the common contract norms would constitute
bad faith.1
4 5
Yet, either of these relational perspectives on good faith evokes many
of the concerns discussed above. Because the substantive content of the
obligation of good faith is tied under each view to proper application of
the norms of relational contract theory, the criticisms of relational con-
tract theory in general apply equally to any relational application of the
obligation of good faith. 146
4. Law and Economics
An economic approach to good faith views the obligation as an im-
plied term that prohibits opportunistic behavior by a party to a con-
tract. 147 Opportunism occurs when a party uses "contractual terms as a
pretense for extracting benefits for which [it has] not bargained."' 148
Good faith thus serves efficiency goals by supplying a provision-"op-
portunistic behavior is prohibited"-that otherwise would require costly
and extensive negotiations to draft specifically into the agreement.
142. Reiter, supra note 24, at 707.
143. Reiter argues that:
[Good faith] reminds us of the incompleteness of written or even oral records of
contracts. The limits of human foresight, the costs and threat to solidarity of
increased specificity, and the insurmountable barrier to complete communica-
tion attributable to our individuality ensure that no record of a contract can be
complete and identically understood by all. Second, it entails "trust," an ele-
ment in whose complete absence no contracting could occur. Third, it points
out the participatory nature of contract. Contracts are never two-party affairs,
but borrow heavily from various surrounding communities, from language for
communication, through industry practice to the supra-contract, general social
norms and finally good faith stresses the moral element present in even the most
hard-nosed commercial agreement. Contract is a form of social behaviour in-
fused with notions of doing right. Present throughout the other intermediate
norms, this fact, without which contract could not exist, merits independent
attention.
Id. at 727; see also supra notes 123-25 (discussion of norms in relational theory).
144. Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 123, at 348 n.21; see also R. Macneil,
supra note 117, at 378 & n.258 (discussing Reiter's and Ian Macneil's views on good faith
as common contract norm).
145. See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 123, at 347-48 n.21.
146.- The relational approach, therefore, is subject to many of the criticisms levied
against the excluder approach. See supra note 88.
147. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 140-47; Goetz & Scott, supra note 116, at 1136-40;
Muris, supra note 24.
148. Fischel, supra note 7, at 141.
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Nonetheless, in the lender liability context the economic conceptual-
ization of good faith concededly poses a threat of improper judicial inter-
vention. Ordinarily, a borrower will grant a lender broad discretion or
rights which decrease the chance of borrower misbehavior and allow the
lender to monitor the borrower's business. This, in turn, results in a
lower interest rate for the borrower. 149 The more absolute the power or
discretion, the less risk assumed by the lender (which presumably the
lender "paid for" by giving the borrower a reduced interest rate), but the
greater incentive for opportunism.15 0 Judicial intervention that expan-
sively limits the lender's discretion or power dilutes the strength of the
bond purchased by the lender, and, therefore, the bond's effectiveness in
securing more favorable rates for borrowers. 51 Yet, judicial reluctance
to interfere increases the potential for opportunistic behavior by the
lender. 152
Implementation of the economic approach to good faith and lender
liability raises several difficulties. A court must determine whether the
lender acted opportunistically. This assessment involves not only the dif-
ficult issue of distinguishing opportunistic behavior from non-opportunis-
tic behavior but also the problem of proving that a lender in fact acted
opportunistically.' 53 In making this determination, a judge must find the
right course between the Scylla of weakening the bargained-for bond and
the Charybdis of protecting the borrower from opportunism."
Thus, dissension and uncertainty begin at the initial questions of deter-
mining when the obligation of good faith applies in lending arrangements
and, if so, what standard is to be used. Judicial applications of the
Code's definitions erect more of a doctrinal labyrinth lacking in any uni-
form application rather than provide an effective, predictable guide for
lender action. The friction intensifies when viewed from the more gen-
eral contract law perspective. At one extreme, good faith might direct a
lender to observe reasonable commercial standards, under the Code, or
be faithful "to an agreed common purpose and consisten[t] with the justi-
fied expectations of the other party," ' as provided by the Restatement.
Yet, at the other extreme, good faith may be merely innocuous, if not
wholly inapplicable.
The dissensions at the doctrinal level have not been tempered by even
149. See id. at 141-42.
150. See id
151. See iL at 142; see also Charny, supra note 10, at 458 ("If courts are willing to
intervene to limit a bank's discretion, borrowers who rationally want to delegate discre-
tion to the bank-for example, to signal their superior reliability or to induce the bank to
accept arrangements that are riskier in other respects-may have difficulty doing so.").
152. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 147.
153. See id at 141-42. A lender rarely will assert that it acted opportunistically. See
id For a discussion of the nature of opportunistic behavior, see Muris, supra note 24, at
522-26.
154. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 142.
155. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a.
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a modicum of consensus at the theoretical level. The accepted view that
good faith serves to enforce the "reasonable expectations of the parties"
devolves into disparate conceptualizations of the obligation. Both the
excluder conceptualization and the relational approach impose "ex-
tracontractual" duties upon the parties. Although agreement-based in-
terpretivist theories shift the obligation conceptually from outside the
agreement to within,156 the methodologies which they advocate for dis-
pute resolution also invite uncertainty.1 57 Finally, the law and econom-
ics approach seeks to disengage the parties' agreement from the
obligation of good faith, but hazards improper intervention.
A good indication of the viability of current theories on good faith is
the courts. Even if judicial acceptance alone cannot be deemed disposi-
tive, the growth in the last decades of lender liability litigation provides a
corpus of judicial decisions to assess the extent to which the theoretical
approaches to good faith have been integrated into the courts. Lender
liability's uniqueness in offering a wealth of transactionally-focused data
generated over the long term allows for subtle distinctions between the
various general approaches to be drawn with greater specificity than in
other areas of good faith law.158
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES
At issue in the lender liability cases is the obligation of good faith's
effect on a lender's exercise of express rights granted by the lending
agreement. In spite of conventional perceptions that the obligation of
156. The interpretivist approaches are therefore more consistent with a notion of indi-
vidual autonomy than the extracontractual approaches. The immutable rule nature of
the obligation of good faith intensifies the appeal of an agreement-based theory of good
faith from a standpoint of autonomy. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990) (obligation of good
faith may not be disclaimed by agreement). Good faith is, more specifically, a hybrid
immutable/default rule under the Code, because although the parties may not opt out of
the general obligation they "may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable." Id. To the extent that the obligation of good faith is deemed to impose
extracontractual principles of morality upon the parties, the obligation takes on the flavor
of an immutable rule, hence posing a greater threat to party autonomy. For example,
how could contracting parties draft around a standard that prohibits "evasion of the
spirit of the bargain" or that enforces the " 'inner logic' of a deal"? See supra text accom-
panying notes 65 (Restatement criteria), 76-79 (excluder approach). In contrast, an
agreement-based approach to good faith accentuates the default rule attributes of good
faith by giving primacy (if only presumptively) to the parties' express terms, thereby facil-
itating the parties' ability to draft around an agreement-based standard for good faith.
For a discussion of the relationship between contract background rules and party auton-
omy, see generally Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989).
157. By its own admission, the deeply interpretivist approach cannot yield predictable
results. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
158. Many current theories claim to be descriptive of judicial behavior in the deciding
good faith cases. See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 24, at 331; Burton, Article 2 Good Faith,
supra note 24, at 5-6; Patterson, Easterbrook on Good Faith, supra note 10, at 532; Sum-
mers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law, supra note 24, at 262.
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good faith has resulted in widespread judicial intervention, 59 no univer-
sal or clearly predominant methodology has in fact emerged from the
decisions. Generally, judicial responses to claims of lender bad faith fall
into three classes: interventionist, 160 interpretivist/relational, ' 6 , and pas-
sive. 62 The approaches will be addressed in reverse order of frequency
of appearance.
A. Interventionist Approach
Interventionist courts use the obligation of good faith to impose stan-
dards of appropriate conduct on a lender irrespective of the parties'
agreement. Thus, the interventionist strategy adopts the "contractual
morality" conceptualization of good faith-that good faith acts to im-
pose an overlay of commercial morality onto the parties' agreement.' 63
For example, a judicial interpretation of the Code's "honesty in fact"
definition as requiring objective standards of commercially reasonable
conduct'" can imply an interventionist attitude 65 toward the obligation
of good faith. Two 1991 decisions from the Ohio Court of Appeals best
illustrate the interventionist strategy.
In the first decision, Cardinal Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Michaels Building Co.,' 66 Michaels Building Co. executed a promissory
note in favor of Cardinal Federal Savings and Loan in the amount of
$750,000.167 The note was secured by an open-end mortgage on the
debtor's shopping center in the amount of $1,240,000.16 s The bank's
commitment letter indicated that the parties contemplated an additional
159. See supra note 27.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 163-89.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 190-270.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 271-308. Two methodological points with re-
spect to these classifications deserve mention. First, the identification of general classifi-
cations differs from the categories of theoretical approaches given above because,
although certain courts may rely upon a particular theory to reach a certain result, many
courts do not expressly do so. Second, an interpretivist might seek to claim that an in-
terventionist decision is justified on interpretivist grounds, for example by asserting that
the standard imposed by the court is consistent with the parties' agreement properly in-
terpreted. The classifications set forth in this section are grounded in how the court
perceived its role in applying the obligation of good faith rather than in whether the
decision is consistent with other theoretical approaches to good faith. For example, some
might claim that KMC., discussed as a deeply interpretivist/relational case, see infra
text accompanying notes 193-227, is an interventionist decision.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 75-88.
164. See cases cited supra note 50.
165. However, since courts rarely expose the underlying impetus for their holding,
adoption of an objective standard for good faith alternatively may reflect a relational/
deeply interpretive strategy toward good faith. See infra note 252.
166. No. 14521, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2199 (Ohio Ct. App. May 8, 1991), dismissed
on joint application, 585 N.E.2d 424 (Ohio 1992).
167. See iL at *4.
168. See id Ohio law allows a mortgagor to file a mortgage that covers future ad-
vances and thereby receive priority with respect to those future advances over certain
subsequent lienholders. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5301.232 (Baldwin 1990).
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$150,000 advance to Michaels if certain conditions were met.' 69
Michaels soon began defaulting in payment and Cardinal exercised its
rights under the mortgage to receive rents and apply them to amounts
due under the note. 170 After demanding payment under the note, Cardi-
nal instituted an action seeking to collect the amounts due. 7 ' Michaels
responded with claims of fraud, breach of contract, breach of the implied
duty of good faith, slander of title, and unconscionability. 72 A jury
found in favor of Michaels and awarded damages in the amount of
$4,000,000. 173
The appellate court refused to reverse the trial court's denial of di-
rected verdict on the issue of good faith. In finding sufficient evidence for
a finding of bad faith, the appellate court focused principally on the fact
that Cardinal was oversecured, which precluded Michaels "from the full
use and benefit of its property due to an unreasonable and unnecessary
burden on the land."'174 Moreover, Michaels alleged that the bank acted
in bad faith by misapplying the rents collected under the mortgage and
by not providing "sufficient time to bring the loans current and to de-
mand funds in excess of those due 75 ... under the threat of immediate
legal action."1 76 In response to Cardinal's argument that it did no more
than exercise rights permitted by the agreement, the court found that
Michaels' claim lay "outside the border of the parties' contracts" and
affirmed the finding of bad faith conduct by Cardinal. 177
A similar approach to good faith was employed by a majority of the
Ohio Court of Appeals in Bank One, N.A. v. Grantham, Inc. 178 The bor-
rower, Grantham, Inc., had experienced severe financial difficulties and
mismanagement from 1980-1984 and, after a series of attempts to renego-
tiate the loan and to seek new investors, the bank made demand under
three demand notes executed by Grantham. 179 Because a term note exe-
cuted by Grantham contained a cross-default clause providing that de-
fault in other indebtedness constituted a default under the term note,
Bank One also accelerated the term note.' 80 Bank One commenced fore-
closure actions against Grantham, who had filed for bankruptcy protec-
169. See Cardinal Federal, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2199, at *15-16. The borrower
conceded that those conditions were never met. See id.
170. See id. at *5.
171. See id.
172. See id. at *6.
173. See id. at *8-*9.
174. Id. at *15.
175. The mortgage contained an ambiguity over whether a higher default rate of inter-
est applied to the entire loan amount outstanding or merely the amounts currently in
default. See id. at *4.
176. Id. at *17.
177. Id. at *18-*19.
178. Nos. 90-G-1555, 90-G-1556, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4722 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
30, 1991), vacated, 588 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1992). This case was vacated and remanded by
the Ohio Supreme Court without an opinion.
179. See Grantham, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4722, at *3-*4.
180. See id. at *2-*4.
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tion. Grantham responded with a counterclaim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious
interference with contractual relations, fraud, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation."8 I
A majority of the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict in
favor of Grantham.1 8 2 Although the court held that Bank One had no
obligation of good faith in calling the demand notes, 83 the obligation did
apply to Bank One's acceleration under the term note.'" Turning to
that issue, which was governed by the Code provisions on good faith, 85
the court utilized the Code's "honesty in fact" definition but articulated
the scope of the obligation as precluding "commercially unjustifiable"
behavior. 86 The court found sufficient evidence supporting the jury's
conclusion that Bank One acted in a commercially unjustifiable manner.
The court based its decision on the facts that: (1) the term loan was
current at the time the bank exercised its right to accelerate under the
cross-default provision; (2) the bank refused to execute a "standstill"
agreement which would have facilitated new investors coming in; (3) the
bank refused to remove its call letter, which hindered new investors from
coming in; (4) the bank was adequately secured; (5) the bank refused to
release collateral until the entire corporate debt had been paid; (6) the
bank's complaints with current management would have been allayed if
new investors had come in; (7) the company's financial difficulties seemed
to be easing, with evidence of increasing sales; and (8) the company's
financial difficulties had been ongoing for a long period of time.'
The Grantham decision was not without strong dissent. The dissent-
ing judge strongly rebuked the majority for its interventionist
methodology:
[A]n expansive interpretation of honesty in fact, such as commer-
cially unjustifiable, is undesirable because it will inevitably lead to vio-
lations of the basic principles of contract interpretation. Perhaps the
most fundamental rule of contract law is that the express language of
an agreement is always controlling. Stated differently, a court is al-
ways bound to enforce the explicit terms of the agreement, since those
terms are the best indication of the intent of the parties. A court can
only look beyond the four comers of the contract when the applicable
language is ambiguous.
When the majority's standard is applied to unambiguous language,
such as that in a default acceleration clause, the foregoing rule is
181. See id at *4.
182. See id at *22.
183. However, because the demand notes contained insecurity and cross-default
clauses, see id at *2-*3, the court could have used a Reid analysis to find that the notes
were functionally term notes to which the obligation applied. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
184. See Grantham, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4722, at "16- 17.
185. See id. at *11.
186. See id at *20-*21; see also supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
187. See Grantham, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4722, at 021-*22.
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clearly violated. An implied term would be added to the clause. To
wit: a lender cannot exercise its right to accelerate whenever an event
of default occurs, but can only do so when the action is commercially
justifiable. Under these circumstances, the lender is essentially denied
the benefit of its bargain, since it cannot exercise its right in the man-
ner which is expressly stated in the contract.1 88
The different principles that underlie this dissent and the majority ap-
proach in Grantham and the court's approach in Cardinal are readily
discernible. The court in Cardinal and the majority in Grantham view
the obligation of good faith as superimposing a contractual obligation of
"fair play" in the exercise of a bank's express rights. The question in
Cardinal was not whether Cardinal was entitled by agreement to do what
the agreement allowed it to do, but whether given its over-secured collat-
eral position its behavior toward the borrower was hasty. Similarly, the
Grantham majority does not dispute that Bank One had the contractual
right to accelerate the loans. Rather, in the majority's view the bank
ought to have refrained from exercising those rights to allow the bor-
rower a more dignified exit from the transaction, particularly when, as
was also the case in Cardinal, the bank was adequately secured.
Thus, the interventionist approach commands that lenders "do good"
vis-A-vis their borrowers irrespective of their agreements. This approach,
although not without some support in the courts, is visible only
infrequently. 89
188. Id. at *44-*45 (Christley, J., dissenting). The dissent continued:
In relation to this point, it is important to note that the general obligation of
good faith under U.C.C. § 1-203 is distinct from the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility. The latter rule empowers a court to alter an unjust provision which was
the result of unequal bargaining positions. In situations like the one in the in-
stant case, involving a commercial loan between a bank and a small company,
the doctrine of unconscionability simply does not apply. The loan agreement
was clearly the result of arm's length negotiations, in which the bargaining posi-
tions of the respective parties were fairly equal. Again, under these circum-
stances, the unambiguous terms of the agreement should control. The duty of
good faith should not be used to rewrite the agreement.
Id. at *45-*46 (Christley, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent, in terms of this
Article, advocates a passive strategy toward resolution of good faith issue. See infra text
accompanying notes 271-308. Although the Ohio Supreme Court, by a 4 to 2 majority,
granted without opinion Bank One's motion to vacate and remanded the case, see 588
N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1992), whether the Supreme Court did so in reliance upon the argu-
ments raised in the dissent remains a mystery.
189. For other applications of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing which imply
an interventionist bent, see Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975, 982
(5th Cir. 1992) (bank cannot take advantage of technical default to accelerate); Skeels v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1964) (good faith is obligation
of "fundamental integrity"); Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F. Supp. 829, 844 (D. Mass. 1992)
(one may not injure other party's right to receive fruits of contract); Martin Specialty
Vehicles, Inc. v. Bank of Boston (In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc.), 87 B.R. 752, 766
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (good faith prohibits "objectively oppressive and unfair" behav-
ior and also "deceitful and downright dishonest" conduct), rev'd on other grounds, 97
B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989); Ricci v. Key Bancshares, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.
Me. 1987) (good faith prohibits abrupt termination of "sustained, active and flexible
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B. Interpretivist/Relational Approaches
In contrast to the interventionist strategy, the interpretivist and rela-
tional approaches to good faith have gained some acceptance in the
courts, although in widely varying degrees. The perhaps most debated
lender liability case, K.MC. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,' 90 is considered the
guiding star of the deeply interpretivist' 9 and relational192 theories and,
therefore, merits extensive analysis. A discussion of alternative interpre-
tive approaches to good faith follows.
1. Deeply Interpretive/Relational Applications: K.M. C. and Progeny
In K.M. C., the borrower K.M.C. Company, Inc., a wholesale and re-
tail grocery business, sued Irving Trust Company for breach of a financ-
ing agreement between K.M.C. and Irving.' 93 Pursuant to the financing
agreement, entered into in 1979, Irving agreed to extend to K.M.C.
credit to a maximum of $3,000,000, increased later to $3,500,000. 194 The
amounts outstanding under the line of credit were payable on demand. 195
The line of credit was secured by K.M.C.'s accounts receivable and in-
ventory, and availability under the line of credit was determined by a
borrowing base formula. 196 In addition, K.M.C. and Irving entered into
credit relationship"); Noonan v. First Bank, 740 P.2d 631, 634 (Mont. 1987) (good faith
requires that bank not "unnecessarily deprive the [borrowers] of the benefits associated
with the banking relationship between the parties"); Transcript at 11, First Fidelity Bank
v. People Care, Inc., No. L-001554-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 3, 1991) (denying
motion for summary judgment) (holding that good faith "requires an honest effort to
abide by the terms and spirit of the agreement"); Urdang v. Muse, 276 A.2d 397, 399
(Essex County Ct. 1971) ("An acceleration provision is not the law of the Medes and
Persians, operating with iron rigidity under all circumstances."); Garrett v. BankWest,
Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 845 (S.D. 1990) (adopting Summers and Restatement approach);
Lane v. John Deere Co., 767 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn. 1989) (bank cannot take "unconsci-
entious advantage" of borrower when accelerating); Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank of
Neenah, 388 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (in overdraft case, good faith means
"an honest intention to abstain from taking unfair advantage of another, through techni-
calities of law, by failure to provide information... or by other activities which render
the transaction unfair") (citation omitted); see also supra notes 50-51 (courts applying
commercial reasonableness standard for U.C.C. obligation of good faith).
190. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). For discussions of K.M.C, see generally sources
cited supra note 10.
191. See generally Patterson, Good Faith, supra note 105, at 125-55; Patterson, Good
Faith, Lender Liability, supra note 10.
192. See Braucher, supra note 27, at 733-38; Linzer, supra note 141, at 176-78; Patter-
son, Good Faith, Lender Liability, supra note 10, at 184 & n.l 19.
193. See KMC., 757 F.2d at 754.
194. See id.
195. See id at 759.
196. See id. at 754. A "borrowing base" in secured lending refers to a formula which
adds a certain percentage of inventory defined in the agreement as "eligible inventory"
and a certain percentage of accounts receivable defined in the agreement as "eligible re-
ceivables." The sum establishes the maximum amount available under the line of credit.
Although the definitions are commonly individually negotiated, inventory or receivables
are generally "eligible" if the lender has a perfected security interest in the piece of inven-
tory or in the receivable, as the case may be. In addition, the receivable's probability of
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a cash management arrangement whereby all receipts of K.M.C. were
deposited into a blocked account maintained with a participant bank.' 97
K.M.C.'s only means of acquiring working capital was through borrow-
ing under the line of credit.
On March 1, 1982, Irving Trust refused without notice to advance
$800,000 as requested by K.M.C., even though the advance was available
under the terms of the financing agreement.' 98 The previous Friday,
K.M.C. had unsuccessfully requested that Irving increase the line of
credit to $4,000,000.119 After refusing to make the advance, Irving dis-
honored numerous checks drawn by K.M.C. to K.M.C. suppliers.2"
Although Irving agreed three days later to advance K.M.C. $700,000,201
K.M.C. ultimately collapsed. K.M.C. subsequently sued Irving, alleging
that Irving's refusal to advance funds on March 1st constituted a breach
of Irving's duty of good faith and fair dealing and that this breach re-
sulted in K.M.C.'s demise. A jury found Irving liable and awarded
K.M.C. damages in the amount of $7,500,000. °2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
payment often affects its eligibility. The purpose behind the use of a borrowing base in
revolving lines of credit is to ensure that the amounts borrowed under the line of credit
correlate to the amount of quality inventory in which the lender has some assurance that
it is perfected, and to the amount of receivables which are likely to be collected. See
generally William C. Hillman, Commercial Loan Documentation 175-77 (3d ed. 1990).
197. See id. at 759, 761. Under this arrangement, also known as a "lockbox account,"
receipts from the borrower's receivables are sent directly to the bank where the account is
maintained, and the amounts therein are used to pay the borrower's outstanding checks.
To the extent that the amount in the account exceeds the checks drawn, the excess is
applied to reduce the amount outstanding under the line of credit. Because the amounts
outstanding under the line of credit are concomitantly reduced by the cash sweep, the
borrower has increased availability under the line of credit. To the extent that the face
amount of the checks drawn exceed the amounts in the account, the borrower borrows
under the line of credit to cover the checks. At the time K.M.C.'s financing was cut off,
K.M.C. had insufficient funds in the account to cover the checks that had been drawn
and the requested draw under the line of credit was to cover those checks. See Brief for
Defendant-Appellant at 9-11, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.
1985) (No. 83-5563); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 10-11, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5563).
198. See K.MC., 757 F.2d at 754. If Irving had granted this request, K.M.C.'s out-
standing loan balance would have increased to just under the maximum $3.5 million limit
under the line of credit. See id.
199. See id. at 762.
200. See id.; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 8, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5563). The refused advance would have been used to cover
the checks that Irving dishonored.
201. See K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 762.
202. See id. at 752. Although the financing agreement contained a waiver of trial by
jury, neither the trial court nor the court of appeals enforced the waiver clause. See id. at
755-58. The damage award was based on testimony as to K.M.C.'s going concern value
immediately before March 1, 1982, and its value after that date. See id. at 763-66. One
expert based his valuation of K.M.C.'s projected performance upon acquisition by a
larger company, see id. at 764, while another expert compared K.M.C. to a similar whole-
saler acquired on March 1, 1982, see id. at 765-76. For a criticism of the award of dam-
ages in K.M.C., see Fischel, supra note 7, at 153-54.
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jury's verdict.2 °3 The court held that, absent valid business reasons that
prevented Irving from giving such notice, the requirement of good faith
and fair dealing obligated Irving to give notice to K.M.C. prior to cur-
tailing financing. °4 Crucial to the court's analysis was the fact that all of
K.M.C.'s receipts were placed into the blocked account, depriving
K.M.C. of any working capital while any portion of the line of credit was
outstanding.20" Under a "literal interpretation" of the credit agreement,
K.M.C.'s ongoing existence was thus left "entirely at the whim or mercy
of Irving, absent an obligation of good faith performance." 2" Notice to
K.M.C. prior to Irving's termination of the line of credit would have
allowed K.M.C. to seek alternative means of financing.2 "7 In addition,
the court pointed out that Irving and K.M.C. had "a consistent and un-
interrupted course of dealing ... over an extended period of time."2 8
The court rejected Irving's argument that, because the amounts out-
standing under the line of credit could be called on demand, Irving could
refuse to lend without notice.2"9 The court reasoned that the express
demand provision in the financing agreement also was limited by an obli-
gation of good faith.210 Irving's right to demand, therefore, would
203. See K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 766.
204. See id at 759.
205. See id; see also Canterbury Realty & Equip. Corp. v. Poughkeepsie Say. Bank,
524 N.Y.S.2d 531, 532-33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (bank's refusal to honor checks and its
retention of proceeds from receivables under "lock box" arrangement alleged to be "sud-
den, effective strangulation of [borrower's] economic lifeline caus[ing] it to cease
operations").
206. KMC., 757 F.2d at 759.
207. See id The proceeds from the alternative financing would be used to pay off the
outstanding indebtedness owed to Irving, in exchange for a release of Irving's security
interest in K.M.C.'s receivables and inventory.
208. 1d.
209. See id at 760.
210. The court stated that
just as Irving's discretion whether or not to advance funds is limited by an
obligation of good faith performance, so too would be its power to demand
repayment. The demand provision is a kind of acceleration clause, upon which
the Uniform Commercial Code and the courts have imposed limitations of rea-
sonableness and fairness.
Id (citing U.C.C. § 1-208 (1990) and Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367,
1375-80 (9th Cir. 1979)).
The K.M.C. court thus agreed with the view that demand notes are limited by an
obligation of good faith irrespective of the comment to U.C.C. § 1-208. See supra note 56
and accompanying text. Debate has arisen over whether the court's discussion of good
faith in demand notes, which is dicta because Irving did not demand payment from
K.M.C. but rather merely refused to lend, has any precedential value. Compare West &
Haggerty, supra note 9, at 101-02 (arguing that the demanding payment analogy by the
court is only dicta) and Granoff, supra note 9, at 498 (same) with Patterson, Good Faith.
Lender Liability, supra note 10, at 181 n.91 (refusal to lend is equivalent of demand, thus
court's discussion is valid); see also Check Reporting Servs. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 478
N.W.2d 893, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (K.M.C court's statement on demand is dicta
and not persuasive); Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 953 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) ("When a bank calls a demand note, it is a more onerous burden on the
debtor than when a bank refuses to disburse additional funds.").
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
equally have been subject to the court's notice requirement.
Examining the evidence presented at trial, the court found sufficient
evidence that Irving's loan officer, Sarokin, did not have a valid business
reason for refusing to lend without prior notice. The court first stated
that Irving's conduct "to a certain extent ... must be measured by objec-
tive standards." '211 However, after rejecting an entirely objective or en-
tirely subjective standard for assessing the good faith of Irving's decision
not to lend, the court applied a mixed subjective and objective test.21 2
The court found ample evidence supporting the jury's determination that
"no reasonable loan officer in the same situation would have refused to
advance funds to K.M.C. without notice as Sarokin did on March 1,
1982."23 Irving itself had no internal policy of terminating financing
without notice.214 There was testimony from an officer of a bank partici-
pating in the loan to K.M.C. that both the participant bank officer, as
well as any reasonable banker examining the loan, would have believed
that the loan was fully secured.21 5 On March 1st, Sarokin himself told an
attorney representing a wholesaler interested in acquiring K.M.C. that
Irving would advance the requested funds in order to allow the potential
acquiror to evaluate K.M.C. The next day, the attorney was informed
that Sarokin "had changed his mind and decided to 'proceed with his
game plan.' ,,216 In sum, there was ample evidence for a jury to conclude
that Irving did not have a valid business reason for refusing to advance
the funds and, accordingly, prior notice was required.21 7
A full understanding of K.M.C necessitates moving beyond the court's
facial treatment of the subjective/objective standards for good faith and
the issue of whether there is an obligation of good faith in demand notes.
The case is inconsistent with several of the conceptualizations of good
faith discussed above.218 For example, ample precedent existed at the
time to support a finding that good faith in fact does not require no-
211. K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 761.
212. See id. The court framed the test as follows:
While it is not necessary that Sarokin have been correct in his understanding of
the facts and circumstances pertinent to his decision not to advance funds for
this court to find that he made a valid business judgment in doing so, there must
at least be some objective basis upon which a reasonable loan officer in the exer-
cise of his discretion would have acted in that manner.
Id.; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
213. K.MC., 757 F.2d at 761.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 761-62. Although Irving conceded that the bank was adequately se-
cured when it refused to advance funds, it argued that the important point was the
debtor's capacity to repay the loan rather than the adequacy of security. See id. at 762.
However, the court pointed out that Irving had quarterly audits and other information
showing that the security would rapidly pay down the loan and that K.M.C.'s inventory
position was strong. See id. This information undermined Sarokin's claim that K.M.C.'s
payables and receivables position indicated that K.M.C. was near collapse. See id.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 763.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 73-154.
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tice.2 19 Hence, under the notion of "good faith law," the K.M. C result
appears unjustified and startling. No evidence was presented suggesting
that Irving's discretionary right220 to refuse to continue financing or its
right to enforce the contract was exercised for improper purposes, or to
recapture an opportunity foregone at the time of contracting."I
Thus, the case is best explained either by the court's use of a deeply
interpretive process to determine what the parties' agreement "really
meant '222 or by a relational analysis of KMC. The exchange between
K.M.C. and Irving involved prolonged interaction between the parties.
The court expressed concern about the continuous past dealings between
K.M.C. and Irving and the degree of leverage that Irving exercised over
K.M.C. through the cash management arrangement. Thus, the court ac-
knowledged the exchange's relational characteristics. The agreement
was not a short-term, lump-sum disbursement of funds but rather was a
long-term interactive relationship between the parties. The use of a bor-
rowing base to calculate amounts available under the line of credit also
increased Irving's leverage over the company's affairs through determi-
nation of eligibility of receivables and inventory. Although not discussed
in the court's opinion, there were allegations that Sarokin demanded that
K.M.C. "cut off" a long-time customer that was behind on its bills.3
According to K.M.C., Irving exercised substantial control over the com-
pany's financial affairs, even at one time forcing it to change its pricing
policy.224 K.M.C. also asserted that "Sarokin believed the way to deal
with clients of the bank was to put them under 'pressure.' ,2 K.M.C.
was in a position of dependence upon Irving and Sarokin.
219. See Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1975); Custom Panel Sys., Inc. v.
Bank of Hampton, 239 S.E.2d 558, 559 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); Van Bibber v. Norris, 419
N.E.2d 115, 122-23 (Ind. 1981); Cascade Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 612
P.2d 332, 333 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l
Bank, 518 P.2d 734, 737 (Wash. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974). For cases
subsequent to KM. C holding that no notice is required, see infra note 230.
220. This assumes that the lender's election to refuse to continue financing, as ex-
pressly provided for in the agreement, can be deemed "discretionary." See supra note 99;
cf. Layne v. Fort Carson Nat'l Bank, 655 P.2d 856, 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (withhold-
ing of consent not contrary to good faith); Quintana v. First Interstate Bank, 737 P.2d
896, 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (mortgagee's consent not limited in any manner by good
faith); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Karsnak, No. CA 91-08-013, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 252,
at *4-*5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1992) (option to accelerate upon default not discretion-
ary); State Nat'l Bank v. Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
("The Bank's rights under [the] agreements were clear and cannot subsequently be lim-
ited by labelling its decision to pursue collection efforts as discretionary.").
221. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 143-44.
222. See Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, supra note 10, at 191-202; Patterson,
Easterbrook on Good Faith, supra note 10, at 521-25.
223. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 9, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752
(6th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5563).
224. See id at 8-10.
225. Id at 9. Although not raised before the court, K.M.C. could have attempted to
recover based on Irving's control over K.M.C. For a discussion of lender control liabil-
ity, see generally Lawrence, supra note 71, at 1399-1403.
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In the court's view, Irving's failure to give notice of its refusal to ad-
vance funds without a valid business reason constituted bad faith.226 The
notice provision, which would have allowed K.M.C. time to seek alterna-
tive financing, represents a careful balance by the court of several rela-
tional contract norms. Effectuation of planning and consent are served
because Irving could terminate the financing after giving notice. The no-
tice provision did not contravene any compelling planning interests of
Irving, particularly when Irving was fully secured. Notice, however, fur-
thers other, non-consensual norms. It maintains flexibility at no expense
to Irving's interests. Notice also furthers contractual solidarity by al-
lowing time for the parties to negotiate through the conflict. Addition-
ally, notice ensures procedural fairness by preventing unfair surprise. In
sum, the more relational norms were served by the notice requirement at
no expense to planning, consent, and expectation. Accordingly, K.M. C.
is a relational/deeply interpretive application of good faith.227
Given the outcry that emerged as a result of the K.M.C decision,228
the extent to which the K.MC. interpretive/relational approach has been
226. The court stated that "[i]f Irving had given K.M.C. 30 days, 7 days, even 48
hours notice, we would be facing a different case." K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757
F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985). If K.M.C. within that notice period could have secured a
commitment for financing from another lending institution which when completed would
repay in full K.M.C.'s debt to Irving, the court indicated that Irving's termination at the
end of the notice period prior to closing of the financing might be "arbitrary and capri-
cious." See id. at 763 n.13.
Other courts have distinguished K.M. C. as solely requiring notice. See National West-
minster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'dsub nom. Yaeger
v. National Westminster, 962 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1992); In re William A. Smith Constr. Co.,
86 B.R. 115, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 B.R. 228,
237 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986); Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n v. SunAmp Sys., Inc., 838
P.2d 1314, 1322-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
227. For an interpretivist defense of K.M.C., see generally Patterson, Good Faith,
Lender Liability, supra note 10. To a great extent the relational and deeply interpretive
approaches to good faith differ in application only as to the legal bounds of the parties'
agreement. See supra note 141. A traditional relational thinker would adopt a narrow
conception of agreement but would assess the parties' relation outside of the agreement in
determining the breadth of the obligation of good faith. The deeply interpretive approach
moves much of the "relation" into a broadly construed "agreement." The approaches
differ at the theoretical level as to the initial scope of agreement-a distinction not lightly
ignored. Many of the cases, however, can be justified on either relational or deeply inter-
pretive grounds by asserting either that the court is really enforcing the extra-agreement
relation or the intra-agreement relation. Courts rarely provide sufficient data to deter-
mine which of the two perspectives motivated the decision. For a non-lender good faith
case recognizing the distinction between relational contract and agreement, see Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. CIV.A.12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *23 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991):
Generally speaking, contracting parties are, to a large extent, entitled to act
selfishly to promote their own interests under the contract. While in a rela-
tional contract it may be short-sighted and bad business to do so, they generally
are entitled to push their claims of entitlement under a contract in an attempt to
maximize their self-interest.
228. Compare Patterson, Easterbrook on Good Faith, supra note 10 (defending K.MC.)
with Fischel, supra note 7 (criticizing K.M. C.) and Snyderman, Comment, supra note 10
(same).
1993] LENDER LIABILITY GOOD FAITH LITIGATION
accepted by the courts is of critical importance. Surprisingly, and con-
trary to the assumption of some writers, 2 9 K.M. C. is a weak thread by
which to hang a relational or deeply interpretive revolution in the courts.
The case has been questioned by numerous courts.230 Because courts
have diverged on the Code's good faith doctrine,23' and given the indi-
vidualized nature of lending arrangements, it is nearly impossible to state
precisely where other lender liability cases stand in relation to K.M.C. It
appears, however, that courts are largely insensitive to factors in lending
relationships that would justify a relational or deeply interpretive ap-
proach to good faith. Factors such as length of relations, a lender's con-
trol over the borrower, and communication between the borrower and
lender support a more expansive view of good faith. Yet, in most cases
these factors are not deemed significant.
a. Length of Relations
Unlike the K.MC. court, most courts appear indifferent to the fact
that the parties had a long-term, interactive relationship. For example,
in Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, Ina v. Western Security Bank,232 a case
very similar to K.MC., the court affirmed the lender's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of good faith. In this case the lender and
borrower "had a longstanding banking relationship" which included
"loan transactions and the frequent exchange of advice and ideas."" 3
The lender refused to make advances on a line of credit after the bor-
rower defaulted on the loan agreement. Due to the refusal, the borrower
suffered from both a lack of cash flow and a loss of its bonding.' More-
over, the lender exercised its rights under the security agreement to take
possession of the borrower's collateral and liquidated the majority of the
assets.235 Regardless of the parties' relationship, the Lambert Plumbing
court held that "[a]cting according to express terms of a contract is not a
breach of good faith and fair dealing. '236
Such disregard for long-term relations evokes objection, as seen in the
229. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 141, at 177-78 (courts use good faith relationally);
Lawrence v. Farm Credit Sys. Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640, 656 (,Vyo. 1988) (Urbigkit,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (K.M.C "may be considered as a premier
case in persuasive authority").
230. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Idaho First Nat'l Bank v.
David Steed & Assocs., 825 P.2d 79, 83 (Idaho 1992) (no notification of intent not to
renew credit line required); Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 605 A.2d 609,
613-14 (Me. 1992) (no notice required for demand instrument); Blome v. First Nat'l
Bank, 776 P.2d 525, 529 (Mont. 1989) (no duty to give notice prior to termination of
financing); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 831 (N.Y. 1988)
(no good faith obligation of notice).
231. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
232. 934 F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1991).
233. Id at 978.
234. See id at 978-79.
235. See id at 979.
236. Id at 983.
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dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corp.237
In that case, a majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court examined the
good faith issue and affirmed a directed verdict in favor of the lender. 238
In Lawrence, the borrower had fallen into financial difficulties after a
spring blizzard caused major livestock losses at the borrower's ranch.239
The losses undermined the borrower's ability to obtain alternative financ-
ing. Additionally, its current lenders sought foreclosure on their notes as
the notes became due.2" The Lawrence majority relied principally on an
"effectiveness of express terms" approach to good faith in finding no is-
sue of fact with respect to the lender's foreclosure on collateral.241 In a
harsh dissent, however, Justice Urbigkit urged that courts look beyond
the "transactional arrangement of the parties" and instead examine the
parties' "ongoing long-term understanding" and "years of mutual busi-
ness association" in determining the lender's good faith.242 These exhor-
tations have apparently often been overlooked. While some courts
mention the length of the parties' relationship, most do not appear to
deem that fact legally relevant in assessing the lender's good faith.243
237. 761 P.2d 640, 654-56 (Wyo. 1988).
238. See id. at 651-52.
239. See id. at 649.
240. See id. at 651.
241. See id. The majority's "effectiveness of express terms" approach is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 271-308.
242. My principal objection to the court's decision is it confines the course of
business status of the business relationship, which occurred over years, to the
particularized terms of the annualized loan security documents. Those docu-
ments were the result of the transactional arrangement of the parties and were
not intended to create the ongoing long-term understanding between the par-
ties. Obviously, if the borrower had known that [the lender] would jump ship
with availability of capital in the event of a weather disaster, then many years
earlier the borrower would have found an alternative source of financing in or-
der to minimize the constancy of danger from a "pulled plug." The lending
agreement between these parties was derived from understanding in express
statements arising through the years of mutual business association as lender
and borrower. Denial of a jury trial analysis is terribly unjustified.
Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 657 (Urbigkit, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
243. See, e.g., Sanders v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 936 F.2d 273, 275 (6th Cir.
1991) (long standing customers); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Stack, No. CIV.A.91-1320, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16877, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 1991) (25 year relationship); Resnick
v. Resnick, No. 85 Civ. 9026, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14206, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,
1990) (20 year relationship); East Lansing State Bank v. Red Cedar Constr. Co. (In re
Red Cedar Constr. Co.), 63 B.R. 228, 230 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) (long relationship);
Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (over 12 year
relationship); Mann Farms Inc. v. Traders State Bank, 801 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Mont. 1990)
(nine year relationship); Shiplet v. First Sec. Bank, 762 P.2d 242, 243, 246 (Mont. 1988)
(long-term relationship); Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.2d 631, 637 (Mont. 1987)
(long relationship between bank and borrower) (Sheehy, J., dissenting); Central Bank v.
Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 711-12 (Mont. 1985) (19 year relationship); Cascade Steel
Fabricators, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 612 P.2d 332, 332-33 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (12 year
relationship). But cf. Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.
Me. 1987) (lender acted in bad faith "by abruptly terminating their sustained, active and
flexible credit relationship with [the borrower]"); Tri-Company Constr., Inc. v. Farmers
& Merchants State Bank, No. 64,872, 1991 Kan. App. LEXIS 1, at *15-*16 (Kan. Ct.
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b. Control Over Cash Flow
A brief survey of good faith cases ruling in favor of the borrower might
first seem to indicate that the existence of a cash management arrange-
ment, as in K.M. C., could sway the court toward an expansive interpreta-
tion of the obligation of good faith.2" As discussed earlier, the lockbox
in K.M. C. placed the borrower at the mercy of the lender 245 and on rela-
tional or deeply interpretive grounds might give rise to an expectation of
moderation by the lender. In fact, several courts have distinguished
K.M.C. on the ground that the case involved a lockbox arrangement. 246
Nevertheless the existence of a lockbox arrangement does not necessarily
lead to an expansive perspective on the obligation of good faith.247
c. Communication
One fact absent from K.M. C. was a sincere effort by the lender to com-
municate to the borrower any reasons for its behavior or to engage in an
attempt to restructure the loan upon the borrower's financial downturn.
Workout negotiations and a genuine attempt to save the deal rather than
immediately to abandon it would facilitate more relational norms by
forcing further communication and interaction between the parties. In a
surprising number of good faith cases in which the court found in favor
of the lender, the bank had attempted to work out the problematic loan
before acting, or had otherwise waited for new financing to be put into
App. Jan. 4, 1991) (giving weight to twenty-year relationship); Production Credit Ass'n
v. Halverson, 386 N.W.2d 905, 907, 910 (N.D. 1986) (reversing summary judgment in
favor of lender where borrower alleged, inter alia, 13 year relationship with lender);
Frank Lerner & Assocs., Inc. v. Merchants & Mechanics Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No.
90AP-1045, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2938, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20, 1991) (noting
commercial unreasonableness "especially given the long-standing relationship").
244. See, ag., Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1987) (without notice
bank offset debt with borrower's accounts receivable); Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 81 B.R. 194, 203 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (borrower maintained accounts at
bank); First Nat'l Bank v. Sylvester, 554 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (bor-
rower moved accounts to bank); Canterbury Realty & Equip. Corp. v. Poughkeepsie Say.
Bank, 524 N.Y.S.2d 531, 532 (App. Div. 1988) (lock box arrangement).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
246. See Fasoino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1057-58
(2d Cir. 1992); Check Reporting Servs., Inc. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 478 N.W.2d 893,
899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 953
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 388 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Wis. Ct. App.
1986).
247. See, eg., Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336,
1341-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting K.M.G and finding in favor of bank where
lock-box arrangement existed); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d
824, 831 (N.Y. 1988) (finding no bad faith when bank, without notice, segregated bor-
rower's working capital account and dishonored checks drawn thereunder); Allied Sheet
Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 518 P.2d 734, 736 n.2, 738 n.5 (Vash. Ct.
App.) (abrupt termination of line of credit not bad faith even where borrower "was com-
pletely dependent upon defendant bank for its financial operation"), cerL denied, 419 U.S.
967 (1974); cf Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1337-39
(7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (rejecting testimony regarding lock-box arrangements).
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place.24 Similarly, in affirming a finding of bad faith by the lender, some
courts have noted that the lender refused to give reasons to the borrower
for its behavior.249 Yet when directly confronted with the proposition
that good faith imposes a legal duty to attempt workout negotiations
prior to enforcing express rights,25 ° courts nearly unanimously reject
it. 25 1
248. See Micronesian Yachts Co. v. Bank of Guam, No. 90-16663, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 865, at *3-*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); Mirax Chem. Prods. Corp. v. First Inter-
state Commercial Corp., 950 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1991); Sanders v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 936 F.2d 273, 276 (6th Cir. 1991); C.H. Betterton v. First Interstate Bank,
N.A., 800 F.2d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1986); Bank of Md. v. Kule, No. 91 Civ. 6490, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8947, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1992); Bankers Trust Co. v. F.D. Rich
Co., No. 90 Civ. 4827, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14682, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1991);
Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Flagship Nat'l
Bank, 485 So. 2d at 1338-39; Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 269 S.E.2d
916, 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824
P.2d 841, 847 (Idaho 1991); Wooden v. First Sec. Bank, 822 P.2d 995, 996-97 (Idaho
1991); Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Farmers
Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 675 (Iowa 1975); Check Reporting
Servs. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 478 N.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); First Sec.
Bank & Trust v. VZ Ranch, 807 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Mont. 1991); Lachenmaier v. First
Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 616 (Mont. 1990); Mann Farms Inc. v. Traders State
Bank, 801 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Mont. 1990) (extensive efforts at refinancing); Coles Dep't
Store v. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings, 783 P.2d 932, 933 (Mont. 1989); Shiplet v. First
Sec. Bank, 762 P.2d 242, 244 (Mont. 1988); Noonan v. First Bank, 740 P.2d 631, 633
(Mont. 1987); Central Bank v. Eystad, 710 P.2d 710, 711 (Mont. 1985); Garrett v.
BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 836 (S.D. 1990).
249. See Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); Clayton v. Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1982). But cf Affili-
ated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521, 527-28 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (giving reasons for exercising right irrelevant).
250. Support for such a duty derives from K.M.C. Borrower's counsel have argued
unsuccessfully that K.M.C. requires a good faith obligation to engage in post-default
workouts. See Halliburton Co. v. William A. Smith Constr. Co. (In re William A. Smith
Constr. Co.), 86 B.R. 115, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). K.M.C. also has been cited as
authority for a legal obligation to provide "adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity
to find alternative financing." Quality Automotive Co. v. Signet Bank/Md., No. 92-1619,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 901, at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1993). See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v.
Chern, No. 90 Civ. 7459, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11364, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1992);
Quality Automotive Co. v. Signet Bank/Md., 775 F. Supp. 849, 851 (D. Md. 1991);
Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n v. SunAmp Sys., Inc., 838 P.2d 1314, 1320-23 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992); see also Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052,
1057-58 (2d Cir. 1992) (limiting any obligation to give notice to cases of blocked ac-
counts); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Douglas, 606 A.2d 684, 686 n.2 (Conn. 1992) (trial
allowed to determine whether refusal to cooperate in workouts constituted bad faith; jury
found for bank); Lawrence v. Farm Credit Sys. Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640, 657 (Wyo.
1988) (Urbigkit, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The obdurate and unex-
pected rejection of continued financing responsibility by the [lender] was exasperated [sic]
... in failure to even cooperate with the borrower so that substitute credit might be
acquired. This lender was not to be a port in any storm but rather an abyss when turbu-
lence was encountered.").
251. See Micronesian Yachts Co. v. Bank of Guam, No. 90-16663, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 865, at *11-*12 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (no duty to assist or renegotiate); Resolu-
tion Trust Corp. v. Lesal Assocs., 91 Civ. 2025, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6620, at *16-* 17
(S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1992) (refusal to negotiate not bad faith); Bohm v. Commerce Union
Bank, 794 F. Supp. 158, 163 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (no duty to assist); Bank of Md. v. Kule,
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Thus, the expansive relational and interpretive principles that could
have stemmed from the K.M. C. decision have been significantly undercut
by other courts. K.MC.'s precedential force is nominal, if not nil in
some jurisdictions. Although not without exception,2 52 the deeply inter-
No. 91 Civ. 6490, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8947, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1992) (refusal to
negotiate not bad faith); Bank of New York v. Sasson, 786 F. Supp. 349, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (no good faith obligation "to take actions contrary to [the lender's] own economic
interest such as extending, or even negotiating the possible extension of, a risky loan");
Barclays Business Credit, Inc. v. Inter Urban Broadcasting, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 2272, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17473, at *18-*20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1991) (refusal to renegotiate
terms not bad faith); Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
721 F. Supp. 940, 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (failure to respond not bad faith); Haliburton
Co., 86 B.R. at 119 (refusal to engage in post-default workout not bad faith); Mendel v.
Production Credit Ass'n, 656 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (D.S.D. 1987) (failure to forbear not
bad faith), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 862 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988); Crissey v. Alaska
USA Fed. Credit Union, 811 P.2d 1057, 1060 n.2 (Alaska 1991) (refusal to renegotiate
not bad faith); Montana Bank of Circle, N.A. v. Ralph Meyers & Son, Inc., 769 P.2d
1208, 1213 (Mont. 1989) (no legal duty to renegotiate); Citizens Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. Kar-
snak, No. CA91-08-013, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 252, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1992)
(failure to make an effort "to work out alternate financial programs" or "to establish
forbearance strategies" not bad faith); Cascade Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Citizens Bank,
612 P.2d 332, 333 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (failure to grant additional financing not bad
faith); Creeger Brick & Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co., SEDA, 560
A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (no duty to assist borrower in obtaining additional
loans); Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 361-62 (Wash. 1991) (no legal obli-
gation to "consider proposals"); Lawrence v. Farm Credit Sys. Capital Corp., 761 P.2d
640, 651 (Wyo. 1988) (failure to sign nondisturbance agreement enabling borrowers to
obtain alternative financing not bad faith).
252. See, eg., American Sec. Bank, N.A. v. York, No. CIV.A.91-1212, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14309, at *12 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1992) (focusing on alleged oral agreement); Glad
v. Thomas County Nat'l Bank, No. 87-1299-C, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14161, at $5-09
(D. Kan. Sept. 10, 1991) (discussing course of dealing), aff'd sub norm Glad v. Thomas
County Bankshares, Inc., 978 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1992); Quality Automotive Co. v.
Signet Bank/Md., 775 F. Supp. 849, 851-52 (D. Md. 1991) (adopting K.M. C approach);
Fleet Bank, N.A. v. Winthrop Partners, No. CV92-0065008, 1992 WL 369681, at *7
(Conn. Super. CL Nov. 25, 1992) (examining bank's "course of conduct"); American
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Buckland, 777 P.2d 1289, 1291-93 (Mont. 1989) (engaging in
deep factual inquiry); Gilbert Cent. Corp. v. Overland Nat'l Bank, 442 N.W.2d 372, 377-
78 (Neb. 1989) (holding that refusal to lend must be reasonable); Yankton Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Larsen, 365 N.W.2d 430, 434 (Neb. 1985) (focusing on "express or implied
contemplation of the parties"); Components Direct, Inc. v. European Am. Bank & Trust
Co., 572 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (App. Div. 1991) (adopting K.M.C approach); Ford Motor
Co. v. Lyons, 405 N.W.2d 354, 372 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (finding bad faith even where
lender's actions were expressly authorized). In addition, a relational/deeply interpretivist
inclination may be reflected in a court's finding that good faith under the Code includes
"reasonable commercial standards." See cases cited supra note 50.
General judicial restraint to the incorporation of relational contract norms into the
positive law of good faith would not undermine the viability of relational contract theory
under the view that the intertwined, relational nature of exchanges ought not necessarily
predominate over the need for enhancing discreteness in exchange relations. See supra
note 126 (Macneil's views on relational contract law). However, the emerging passive
judicial strategy toward good faith issues, see infra text accompanying notes 271-308, is
problematic for relational contract theory. To the extent that relational contract theory
envisions a relational contract law which advances the need for discreteness within the
realm of relations, the express rejection by some passive courts of the relational character-
istics of exchange, see, eg., infra note 295 and accompanying text, represents a judicial
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pretive and relational strategies toward the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing have yet to emerge perceptibly in the courts.
2. Other Interpretivist Applications
In contrast to the deeply interpretivist and relational approaches, the
agreement-based interpretive approach which focuses upon reasons avail-
able for acting, has made substantial inroads in the courts, as evidenced
by the recent Arizona case of Southwest Savings & Loan Ass'n v. SunAmp
Systems, Inc. 253 At issue in SunAmp Systems was the review of a jury
finding that the lender, Southwest Savings and Loan Association
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it
froze, without notice, SunAmp System's line of credit. The lender then
directed SunAmp to cease using a letter of credit that had previously
been issued, and finally terminated the line of credit.254 Southwest as-
serted that it froze the line because (1) subsequent to entering into the
line of credit, it discovered that a key guaranty of the line might be inva-
lid,255 (2) SunAmp failed to provide monthly financial statements re-
quired as a condition to lending,256 and (3) SunAmp had exceeded the
borrowing base as set forth in the credit agreement.25 7
Southwest contended that because it was acting according to the ex-
press terms of the agreement, the jury's finding of bad faith had no valid
basis.258 SunAmp responded that Southwest was using its contractual
powers only as a pretext and that Southwest "wielded its contractual
authority unfairly,, 259 thus providing sufficient evidence supporting the
jury's finding. 2 ° In addressing the interrelationship between the obliga-
tion of good faith and the express terms of a contract, the Arizona Court
of Appeals noted several cases that adopted an "effectiveness of express
tendency to focus upon discreteness for the sake of discreteness rather than upon the need
for discreteness within relations.
253. 838 P.2d 1314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
254. See id. at 1316-18. The jury awarded SunAmp, who had filed for bankruptcy
protection, damages of $774,141, which were offset against the amounts owed to South-
west under the line of credit. See id. at 1318.
255. See id. at 1317, 1318-19. The guaranty had not been signed by the principal guar-
antor's wife, thus rendering the guaranty subject to attack under Arizona community
property law. See id. at 1315-16.
256. See id. at 1316 & n.2.
257. See id. at 1316-17 & n.l. For a discussion of the use of a borrowing base in
secured lending, see supra note 196. Although Southwest had made prior advances to
SunAmp in excess of amounts available under the borrowing base, the court appears to
have found that SunAmp had retained its right to insist upon compliance with the bor-
rowing base provisions. See SunAmp Systems, 838 P.2d at 1320.
258. See SunAmp Systems, 838 P.2d at 1318-19. Although the agreement was secured
and no doubt involved a security agreement governed by Article 9 of the Code, the court
based its decision on the common-law obligation of good faith. See id. at 1319-20.
259. SunAmp Systems, 838 P.2d at 1319.
260. See id.
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terms" approach to good faith,26 but then continued:
If contracting parties cannot profitably use their contractual powers
without fear that a jury will second-guess them under a vague standard
of good faith, the law will impair the predictability that an orderly
commerce requires. Yet contracting parties, hard as they may try,
cannot reduce every understanding to a stated term. Instances inevita-
bly arise where one party exercises discretion retained or unforeclosed
under a contract in such a way as to deny the other a reasonably ex-
pected benefit of the bargain.
In this case, therefore, inquiry does not end with recognition that
Southwest had contractual authority to freeze, and ultimately termi-
nate, SunAmp's credit line. The question is whether the jury might
reasonably have found that Southwest wrongfully exercised this power
"for a reason beyond the risks" that SunAmp assumed in its loan
agreement or for a reason inconsistent with SunAmp's "justified
expectations. 262
Turning to SunAmp's "justified expectations," the court found that
Southwest had exercised its authority to freeze the line of credit for a
purpose preserved at the time of contracting, namely, to be able "to with-
hold financing pending proof of adequate security" 26 3 -the allegedly de-
fective guaranty.2 64 Similarly, Southwest's subsequent suspension of
SunAmp's right to use the letter of credit was justified for the same rea-
son.2 65 Finally, Southwest's ultimate termination of the entire line of
credit, being based not only on the defective guaranty but also on infor-
mation of SunAmp's deteriorating financial condition and Southwest's
prior attempts to remedy the guaranty problem, was not beyond
SunAmp's justifiable expectations and thus not bad faith. 266 Accord-
ingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the jury's finding of bad
faith.267
The Sun-4mp Systems court's interpretive approach is subtly distin-
guishable from the relational and deeply interpretive approaches dis-
261. See id. at 1319 & n.4. For a discussion of the approach, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 271-308.
262. SunAmp Systems, 838 P.2d at 1319-20 (citations omitted) (citing and quoting
Burton, Common Law Good Faith, supra note 24, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 205 cmt. a (1981)).
263. Id. at 1321.
264. See idL at 1320-22. In resolving this issue, the court examined evidence which
indicated that both SunAmp and Southwest, prior to executing the agreement, considered
the guaranty to be a crucial condition of the loan. See id
265. See id at 1323.
266. See id. at 1323-24. SunAmp also argued that Southwest's failure to give notice
prior to freezing the line of credit constituted bad faith, citing K.M.C as support. How-
ever, the SunAmp Systems court declined to rule on whether to adopt KM.C because,
unlike in KMC., SunAmp was not in a critical financial condition, Southwest had no
knowledge that SunAmp might collapse, and Southwest was not adequately secured due
to the defective guaranty. See id at 1322-23.
267. See id at 1324.
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cussed above. While the latter approaches advocate a deep, factual
inquiry into the totality of the parties' relation or agreement, the
SunAmp Systems methodology only looks to the purposes for which an
express term was invoked and, concomitantly, to purposes within the
parties' justifiable expectations at the time of contracting.268 As a result,
it recognizes only a narrow range of inquiry beyond the parties' express
terms-the purpose and context at the time of contracting-and no fur-
ther. And, while the relational and deeply interpretive approaches arise
only relatively rarely as a judicial strategy,269 the interpretive approach
used in SunAmp Systems has received fairly substantial acceptance in
some courts.270
268. Although SunAmp Systems does not draw the distinction between enforcement
terms and performance terms as this approach advocates, see supra text accompanying
notes 91-104, the court's treatment of the issues, if only intuitively, seems consistent with
the distinction. While the court's analysis with respect to Southwest's failure to lend(arguably a discretion in performance issue, see supra note 99 and accompanying text)
focuses merely upon Southwest's reasons for acting, the discussion of Southwest's termi-
nation of the line of credit (arguably an enforcement term, see supra note 104 and accom-
panying text) focuses not only on Southwest's reasons for acting but also on Southwest's
prior attempts to remedy the situation-an allusion to mitigation. See SunAmp Systems,
838 P.2d at 1323-24.
269. See supra note 252.
270. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1987) (acting for dis-
criminatory reasons); Ford v. Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp., 831 F.2d 1520,
1521 (9th Cir. 1987) (discretionary use of insurance proceeds); Brown v. AVEMCO Inv.
Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (acceleration depends upon proper purpose); Na-
tional Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 679-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (focus-
ing on discretion), aff'd sub nom. Yaeger v. National Westminster, 962 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1992); East Bay Ltd. Partnership v. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 744 F.
Supp. 1118, 1122-23 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (implying that there are limitations on consent),
aff'd, 937 F.2d 619 (11th Cir. 1991); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., No.
90 C 1672, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6523, at *7-*9 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1990) (limitations on
discretion); Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81 B.R. 194, 203 (D. Mass.
1987) (bank's discretion was not "unfettered"); Autoparts Fin. Co. v. Grier Auto Parts,
Inc., 462 F. Supp. 198, 200 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (discussing whether default was minor);
Seay v. Davis, 438 S.W.2d 479, 480-81 (Ark. 1969) (improper acceleration); Schoolcraft
v. Ross, 146 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (limitations on retention of insur-
ance proceeds); Milstein v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 103 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18-19 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972) (same); Bartlett Bank & Trust Co. v. MeJunkins, 497 N.E.2d 398, 404 (I11.
App. Ct. 1986) (limitations on discretion); Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972, 976-77 (I11.
App. Ct. 1986) (same); Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 605 A.2d 609, 614(Me. 1992) (looking to reasons for acting); Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So. 2d
26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983) (discussing discretion); Richland Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Swenson,
816 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Mont. 1991) (limitations on bank's discretion to lend); Lachemnaier
v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 617 (Mont. 1990) (same); Mann Farms Inc. v.
Traders State Bank, 801 P.2d 73, 76 (Mont. 1990) (same); Frank Lerner & Assocs. v.
Merchants & Mechanics Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, No. 90AP-1045, 1991 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2938 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20, 1991) (consistent with enforcement test); Siegner v.
Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n, 820 P.2d 20 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (focusing on discretion
and purposes); Fuqua v. Springfield Prod. Credit Ass'n, No. 86-280-Il (Tenn. Ct. App.
Feb. 27, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file) (K.M.C. precludes "abuse of discre-
tion"); American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 171-73 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991) (considering circumstances surrounding acceleration); Clayton v. Crossroads
Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1982) (focusing on failure to provide reasons).
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C. Passive/"Effectiveness of Express Terms" Approach
The final judicial approach to lender bad faith issues-the passive
strategy-stands in contradistinction to the strategies discussed above in
two principal respects. First, the passive strategy rejects any notion that
good faith provides a vehicle for superimposing standards of contractual
morality over or onto the parties' agreement. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the passive strategy adopts a non-interpretivist approach to-
ward that agreement. In this regard, the passive strategy adopts an "ef-
fectiveness of express terms" approach to good faith in its refusal to
examine more deeply the contextual basis of the parties' contract in an
attempt to ascertain precisely the parties' true "agreement."
From a statutory perspective, judicial implementation of a subjective
standard for the Code definition of good faith27 reflects an underlying
passive strategy toward good faith.272 The recent Seventh Circuit case of
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc v. First Bank 273 best exemplifies the
passive judicial strategy in lender liability litigation while levying the
most vehement (if not hostile) criticism of K.M.C. to date. Kham &
Nate's involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court order subordinating
creditor First Bank of Whiting's secured claim to unsecured status be-
cause of the bank's bad faith conduct.274 Whiting had extended credit to
Kham & Nate's Shoes, a retail shoe store operation, since July 1981.275
After Kham & Nate's filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court issued a January 1984 order approv-
ing a loan agreement between Whiting and Kham & Nate's that
established in Kham & Nate's favor a $300,000 line of credit.2 6 The
agreement granted to Whiting a lien on most of the debtor's post-petition
assets.277 Because Whiting advanced funds under the post-petition line
of credit to repay unsecured advances made prior to the debtor's Chapter
11 petition, Whiting thus effectively converted an unsecured claim into a
secured claim.27"
Approximately two weeks after entering into the post-petition loan
agreement Whiting decided to terminate the line of credit, although it
271. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. Similarly, albeit a point of specu-
lation, judicial refusal to impose an obligation of good faith in certain transactions, see
supra notes 55, 68 and accompanying text, may also be grounded in a passive proclivity
toward good faith.
272. For an analysis of judicial passivity in other areas of contract law, see generally
Schwartz, supra note 116.
273. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
274. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank (In re Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2, Inc.), 97 B.R. 420, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). The Bankruptcy Code allows the
bankruptcy court to subordinate a creditor's debt upon equitable grounds. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 510(c) (1988).
275. See Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1353.
276. See Kham & Nate's, 97 B.R. at 422.
277. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2) (1988) (providing for post-petition lien); Kham &
Nate's, 97 B.R. at 422.
278. See Kham & Nate's, 97 B.R. at 422.
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did not notify the debtor of the decision until two weeks after the deci-
sion was made. 279 The bankruptcy court order approving the agreement
provided that the agreement could be terminated by either party on five
day's written and telephonic notice.280 Although Whiting gave timely
written notice, no telephonic notice was given.281 The bankruptcy court
found that Whiting's abrupt termination of the line of credit constituted
a breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing and subordinated
Whiting's lien. 8 2
The Seventh Circuit disagreed and reversed the bankruptcy court or-
der subordinating Whiting's lien. In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook,
the court articulated its view on contract interpretation:
We do not doubt the force of the proverb that the letter killeth,
while the spirit giveth life. Literal implementation of unadorned lan-
guage may destroy the essence of the venture. Few people pass out of
childhood without learning fables about genies, whose wickedly literal
interpretation of their "masters'" wishes always leads to calamity.
Yet knowledge that literal enforcement means some mismatch between
the parties' expectation and the outcome does not imply a general duty
of "kindness" in performance, or of judicial oversight into whether a
party had "good cause" to act as it did.283
"Demand," in other words, means "demand" and "[f]irms that have ne-
gotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the
great discomfort of their trading partners, without being mulcted for
lack of 'good faith.' "1284 Good faith, according to the court, only pre-
cluded opportunistic behavior by one party in the face of a "gap" in the
contract and could not block the effectiveness of express terms in the
contract.28 5 Since the loan agreement provided for termination upon no-
tice, and there was no evidence of opportunism by Whiting, good faith in
no way limited Whiting's right to terminate. 2 6 Turning to KM. C., the
279. See id. at 422-23. The reasons for the decision, made by Whiting's loan commit-
tee, were that the bank did not like the nature of the credit with a Chapter 11 debtor or
the location of Kham & Nate's stores, and that it did not think it should be doing busi-
ness on the South Side of Chicago, since Whiting was located in Indiana. See id. at 425.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 423.
282. See id. at 427.
283. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank (In re Kham & Nate's Shoes No.
2, Inc.), 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990).
284. Id.
285. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 147-54 (law and economics ap-
proach to good faith). Judge Easterbrook's view that good faith acts as a gap-filler which
does not block the effectiveness of express terms in the contract is delineated further in
Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
816 (1992).
286. See Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1357-58. The court found that Whiting's failure
to give five days' telephonic notice was a "trivial" offense and an "inconsequential
breach[]" not justifying subordination of Whiting's lien. Id. at 1359. Thus, although
Whiting's right to insist upon the express terms of the agreement was absolute, Kham &
Nate's was not.
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court stated that to the extent that KM. C. "holds that a bank must loan
more money or give more advance notice of termination than its contract
requires, we respectfully disagree .... It need not throw good money
after bad, even if other persons would catch the lucre."' 281
As with the K.M. C. approach, the "effectiveness of express terms" ap-
proach of Kham & Nate's is inconsistent with many conceptualizations of
the obligation of good faith. For example, evading the "spirit of the
deal" may act to override the express terms of the contract under a con-
tractual morality perspective on good faith.2"' Whiting's abrupt and im-
mediate termination of the line of credit after having its unsecured claim
transposed into a post-petition secured claim quite conceivably could fall
into this category of bad faith behavior. Assuming that invocation of an
express term constitutes a discretionary or enforcement event, the effec-
tiveness of express terms approach places no constraint on that discre-
tion, as some interpretivists would hold. Moreover, the approach fails to
acknowledge as probative any alleged deeper interpretive gloss on the
literal terms of the parties' agreement.28 9 Kham & Nate's and K.M. C
thus squarely set the battle lines of good faith in lending arrangements.
Given those lines, the Kham & Nate's side appears to be winning. A
substantial number of courts, consistent with Kham & Nate's, Lambert
Plumbing,290 the majority in Lawrence,29 1 and the dissent in the appellate
decision in Grantham292 adopt the "effectiveness of express terms" ap-
proach under which good faith plays no moderating role in the perform-
ance or enforcement of express duties and rights.2 93 Moreover, some
287. Id. at 1358. Although CM.C did not technically hold "that a bank must loan
more money... than its contract require[d]," id, clearly Irving's only option in KM.C
was to have lent the requested funds, because Irving had an obligation to provide reason-
able notice and K.M.C. had drawn checks on the funds requested. See supra note 200.
288. See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law, supra note 24, at 234-35.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 91-115. See generally Patterson, Easterbrook
on Good Faith, supra note 10 (criticizing this approach). Kham & Nate's contradicts the
interpretivist view that good faith excludes acting for reasons forgone at the time of con-
tracting. Not liking a bankrupt debtor or the location of the debtor, see supra note 279,
clearly would be impermissible reasons for action under a credit agreement executed after
the debtor filed for Chapter 11 protection with the lender's full knowledge of the debtor's
location.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 232-36.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 237-41.
292. See supra text accompanying note 188.
293. See In re Nantahala Village, Inc., 976 F.2d 876, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1992); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Corporex Properties, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 423, 425 (E.D. Ky. 1992); Westing-
house Credit Corp. v. Hall, 144 B.R. 568, 576 (S.D. Ga. 1992); Bohm v. Commerce
Union Bank, 794 F. Supp. 158, 163 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Temp-Way Corp. v. Continental
Bank, 139 B.R. 299, 319-20 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 981 F.2d 1248 (3rd Cir. 1992); Van Arnem
Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (E.D. Mich.
1991); Barclays Business Credit, Inc. v. Inter Urban Broadcasting, Inc., No. 90 Civ.
2272, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17473, at *19-*20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1991); Southern Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. 21-26 E. 105th St. Assocs., 145 B.R. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd, 978 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1992); Government Street Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank,
N.A., 553 So. 2d 68, 75 (Ala. 1989); Villegas v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 708 P.2d 781,
784 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 742 (Cal. Ct.
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courts are openly and vocally reluctant to find that good faith restrains a
lender who acts with no motive or bad motives294 or encompasses some
general legal obligation of fairness or decency toward the borrower.295
App. 1989); Layne v. Fort Carson Nat'l Bank, 655 P.2d 856, 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982);
Riedel v. NCNB Nat'l Bank 591 So. 2d 1038, 1040-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Idaho
First Nat'l Bank v. David Steed & Assocs., 825 P.2d 79, 83 (Idaho 1992); Idaho First
Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824 P.2d 841, 862-64 (Idaho 1992); Wooden v.
First Sec. Bank, N.A., 822 P.2d 995, 998 (Idaho 1991); Centerre Bank, N.A. v. Distribu-
tors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Simon v. New Hampshire Say. Bank,
296 A.2d 913, 915 (N.H. 1972); Bank of N.M. v. Sholer, 695 P.2d 832, 833 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1985); Capri Jewelry, Inc. v. Chayavi, 503 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (App. Div. 1986);
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cheton & Rabe, 567 N.E.2d 298, 304 (Ohio Ct. App.),
dismissed, 538 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio 1989); Creeger Brick & Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Mid-State
Bank & Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Bank of Crockett v. Cul-
lipher, 752 S.W.2d 84, 91-92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commer-
cial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521, 527-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); State Nat'l Bank v.
Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Allied Sheet Metal
Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 518 P.2d 734, 738 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974); Valley Bank-Menomonie v. Computerized Business Servs.,
485 N.W.2d 840 (table case), No. 91-2245, 1992 WL 126790, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. March
10, 1992) (per curiam).
294. See, e.g., Quail Ridge Assocs. v. Chemical Bank, 586 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (App.
Div. 1992) ("[W]e do not view [the bank's] motivation... as relevant."); United States
Nat'l Bank v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1092 (Or. 1991) (having bad motive not breach of
obligation of good faith); Affiliated Capital Corp., 834 S.W.2d at 527-28 (no reasons re-
quired in exercising absolute right). But see Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc. v. Bank of
Boston (In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc.), 87 B.R. 752, 766-67 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1988) (assessing bank's ulterior motives), rev'd on other grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass
1989); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 297 (Alaska 1983) (focusing on bank
"specifically acting for the purpose of setting an example and putting [borrowers] under
duress to coerce them to agree to terms to which the plaintiffs were not obligated to
agree"); Quest v. Barnett Bank, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("ulte-
rior motive" relevant).
295. See, e.g., Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1057
(2d Cir. 1992) (no duty of altruism); Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1975)
(lower court's finding that "heavy-handed treatment" not bad faith even if it "is cause for
dismay" was not clearly erroneous); Bank of New York v. Sasson, 786 F. Supp. 349, 354
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (bank not required to act against its own economic interests); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Lesal Assocs., No. 91 Civ. 2025, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6620, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1992) (lender not required to act against economic interest); Van
Arnem Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (E.D.
Mich. 1991) ("[A] lender remains entitled to advance its own interests by enforcement of
contract terms, and is not required to forego enforcement of contract terms to put the
borrower's interests ahead of its own."); Southern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. 21-26 E.
105th St. Assocs., No. 90 Civ. 6959, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16649, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1991) ("The fact that there was a limit to the Bank's generosity cannot be
construed as bad faith."); Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 940, 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) ("Courts... must distinguish between
moral obligations between the parties and legal obligations that are dispositive of the
duties one party owes the other.") (citation omitted); Villegas, 708 P.2d at 784 ("Courts
have no right to remake contracts to comport with some unspecified notion of fairness
nor to refuse enforcement on that ground."); Price, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (good faith
"does not impose an affirmative duty of moderation in the enforcement of legal rights" or
preclude lender from taking "hard line" in renegotiations); Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (bank does not have to disregard own interests);
Hais v. Smith, 547 A.2d 986, 987 (D.C. 1988) (distinguishing good faith from "good
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The opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court in Tolander v. Farmers Na-
tional Bank296 best embodies this attitude of restraint. In Tolander, the
bank accelerated upon deeming itself insecure and used a $16,992.40
check delivered to the bank, but addressed to Tolander, to offset the
amounts due.2 97 The debtor, a financially strapped farmer, alleged that
the bank acted in bad faith in accelerating and in offsetting a check ad-
dressed solely to the debtor.2 98 A former Iowa superintendent of bank-
ing testified on behalf of Tolander, stating that the bank's behavior was
"a malicious act," and that he was "appalled" by the bank's actions.299
Nonetheless, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the bank had acted in
good faith."o° Although it "strongly condemn[ed] aspects of the bank's
conduct"301 and "[allthough the bank obviously collects no plaudits [] it
remains that Tolander has not shown that the bank acquired anything to
which it was not entitled. Notwithstanding its insensitivity to Tolander
the bank was fully justified in considering itself insecure."'3"
In sum, the passive judicial strategy toward good faith in lender liabil-
ity cases is beginning to achieve substantial acceptance in the courts.
True, a predisposition toward passivity must be viewed in the shadow of
the reality that, when faced with a case suggesting a clear lack of bad
faith on the lender's part, the case often efficiently can be disposed of
under the guise of "effectiveness of express terms."30 3 Yet the sheer vol-
ume of cases adopting the approach and, more importantly, the existence
of cases in which vigorous debate over the passive strategy occurs be-
tween majority and dissent3 4 block this easy exit. The emergence of the
passive strategy thus bears significantly upon the debate between the ap-
judgment or a kind heart"); Tolander v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 452 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Iowa
1990) ("insensitivity" not bad faith); Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (no good faith obligation of affirmative action); Shiplet v. First Sec.
Bank, Inc., 762 P.2d 242, 246 (Mont. 1988) (not being "always strictly forthright" not
bad faith); Cheton & Rabe, 567 N.E.2d at 304 (merely being callous not bad faith); Cree-
ger Brick & Bldg. Supply, 560 A.2d at 154 (failing to assist not bad faith); Garrett v.
BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 847 (S.D. 1990) (bank not required to "disregard its
own interest"); Academia, 802 S.W.2d at 294 ("Vague notions of fairness limiting [ex-
press] rights based on the overall relationship between the parties would impermissibly
extend the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] beyond mere definition or modifica-
tion of the terms of the... agreement.").
296. 452 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1990).
297. See id at 424.
298. See id at 425.
299. Id.
300. See id at 426.
301. Id at 422.
302. Id at 426; see also Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1975) (although
demand without notice "cause for dismay," finding of good faith not clearly erroneous).
303. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 329-30. A notable exception is the SunAmp Sys-
tems case, discussed supra text accompanying notes 253-67, which expressly refused to
adopt the effectiveness of express terms approach even though that would have handily
disposed of the issue.
304. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 178-88 (Grantham case); supra text ac-
companying notes 237-42 (Lawrence case).
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propriate conceptualization of the obligation of good faith. Irrespective
of any perceived social repugnancy of a lender's behavior, a number of
courts are unwilling to imbue the obligation of good faith with the shim-
mer of "contractual morality," undermining the strength of any assertion
that that conceptualization reigns in the courts. Moreover, the effective-
ness of express terms approach hints at a reluctance of a substantial
number of courts to assume an interpretive role in determining a lender's
good faith vel non.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the timing of the emergence of
the passive strategy cannot be ignored. The number of courts employing
the passive strategy appears, although maybe coincidentally, to be in-
creasing since "lender liability" became the buzzword of the 1980s. Re-
lated thereto, the number of decisions in favor of the borrower has
decreased significantly since 1990.305 While this shift, both in the theo-
retical conceptualization of the obligation of good faith and in the statis-
tical results of good faith lending cases, may possibly be attributable to
other factors,30 6 the shift leads to some speculation. That the shift in
judicial philosophy may be generated out of the twin concerns of a liabil-
ity explosion30 7 and an institutionally burdensome litigation explosion 308
cannot be ignored. Prior to addressing the propriety of the passive strat-
egy, however, a brief excursus needs to be made into the doctrinal impli-
cations of the interventionist, interpretivist, relational, and passive
strategies.
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
"Whether the decision of the Washington Court of Appeals ad-
versely impacts the public interest because it diminishes freedom of
contract, is inconsistent with the objective theory of contract law and
threatens commercial certainty for borrowers, lenders and other con-
305. See infra app. A.
306. For example, borrowers may be bringing more claims that are either spurious or
that seek to expand the obligation far beyond the point at which a court may feel safe to
go under existing precedent. Moreover, lenders may be settling more claims because
precedent clearly defines bad faith behavior, thus altering the ratio of decisions.
307. To that extent, the liability fear is unjustified. See infra app. A; see also supra note
12 and accompanying text (rejecting idea of liability explosion).
308. The litigation fear may perhaps be justified. See infra app. A (number of cases by
year); see also William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York City,
1960-1980, 39 Emory L.J. 413, 415-17 (1990) (discussing possible causes of increase in
federal court filings through 1986). The current economic climate in particular may be
one alternative explanation for the growth in litigation. See supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text. In addition, the growth in the number of cases accessible to practitioners also
may be partially attributable to the increased availability of cases on computer databases
that until recently were unreported. Although a recent rise in the number of federal
cases, see infra app. B., coupled with the fact that federal courts decided many of the
well-known pro-borrower cases, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, could be evi-
dence of forum shopping, federal courts do not seem significantly more predisposed to-
ward one party than state courts, see infra app. C.
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tracting parties.
' 3 09
"You used to be good people and now you are second class
citizens. '
310
"This action is based on an alleged breach of a written financing
agreement entered into between two business corporations represented
by independent counsel under circumstances where neither party was
under any kind of duress.",3 1
1
"If 'you destroy [a wholesale grocery company's] credit, you destroy
the company.' ,312
The divergent theoretical conceptualizations of the obligation of good
faith and the numerous judicial strategies delineated in the previous sec-
tions illustrate why disputes such as the one in Micronesian Yachts, with
which this Article began, 31 3 are incapable at this time of extra-judicial
settlement. The law in the area of contractual good faith has yet to pro-
vide any consistent positive rules of conduct upon which lenders may
rely or which borrowers legitimately may claim were contravened by
their lender. A case study of the litigation in Badgett v. Security State
Bank,314 exemplifies the indeterminacy which both lenders and borrow-
ers currently face in the name of "good faith."
At issue in Badgett was a loan from Security State Bank to Raymond
and Audrey Badgett, who were in the dairy business. In 1981 they bor-
rowed $476,000 from Security, of which $336,000 was a term loan.31 5 In
1984, the Badgetts decided to quit the dairy business.3 6 They asked that
Security assist in restructuring the loan in order to facilitate liquidation
of their assets and participation in a government termination program. 3"
After negotiations, Security agreed to modify the loan agreement. 318 In
309. Petition for Review at 1, Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash.
1991) (No. 11965-0-I) (bank's statement of "Issues Presented for Review").
310. Brief for Appellants at 12, Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash.
1991) (No. 54834-0) (from affidavit of borrower quoting bank officer's statement to
borrower).
311. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 13, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5563) (bank's statement of "[t]he Essence of this Case").
312. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752
(6th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5563) (quoting statement of bank vice president).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
314. 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991) (en banc).
315. See id. at 358. In addition to the term loan, the remaining S140,000 was for
operating expenses. See id The Court of Appeals remarked that the loan was used to
pay off the Badgett's loan from their previous bank. See Badgett v. Security State Bank,
786 P.2d 302, 303 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991). The term
loan facility provided for a one year call and maturity date, but was amortized over five to
ten years. See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 358. Badgett's first loan officer at Security stated that
this structure was common in agriculture loans, because it allowed the loans to be reex-
amined each year to assess the bank's "collateral position, update financial statements,
and to make projections for the upcoming year." Id.
316. See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 358.
317. See id
318. See id
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1985, the Badgetts decided to re-enter the dairy business.3 1 9 Security in-
dicated that it would require a new loan agreement.32 ° In September
1985, after negotiations, the parties entered into a new agreement provid-
ing for a loan of $1,050,000. The debt was secured by the "livestock,
equipment, feed inventories, and junior liens on all real estate."'32
In early 1986, several months after entering into the new loan agree-
ment, the Badgetts again decided to quit the dairy business, and again
considered participating in a federal termination program under which
participants bid to keep their facilities out of production for five years.3 22
Based on their proposed bid, the Badgetts expected to receive $1,600,000
for their participation in the program if that bid was accepted.323 After
deducting costs for other loans and expenses incurred in maintaining the
dairy facilities until they could be sold at the end of the program, the
Badgetts could not pay off the entire debt owed to Security with the pro-
ceeds from the program.324 Accordingly, the Badgetts met with their
loan officer at Security, Joe Cooke, and initially proposed that Security
accept $1,300,000 in satisfaction of the $1,500,000 debt owed to Security
and forgive the remaining $200,000.325
Cooke did not accept this proposal. Discussions ensued as to a possi-
ble auction sale of the business' cattle and the possibility of deferring
payment on the $200,000 after a release by Security of its lien on the
existing collateral in exchange for a lien on certain unspecified real es-
tate.3 26 No agreement was reached at the meeting and the parties under-
stood that Cooke needed to meet with Security's loan committee.327 As
in KMC., there was some evidence of hostility in the relationship be-
tween Cooke and the Badgetts.328 Cooke presented only the Badgett's
proposal for a twenty percent forgiveness of the loan to the loan commit-
tee and allegedly characterized it as a "take-it-or-leave-it" non-negotiable
proposition by the Badgetts, which the loan committee opted to leave
rather than take.329
The Badgetts subsequently submitted a higher bid to the federal termi-
nation program in order to receive proceeds sufficient to pay off the Se-
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. Id.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See Badgett v. Security State Bank, 786 P.2d 302, 304 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990),
rev'd, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991). The Badgett's debt to Security was over $1,500,000,
comprised of the $1,050,000 loan in 1985 and the restructured $476,000 loan in 1981.
See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 358.
325. See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 358.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See Badgett v. Security State Bank, 786 P.2d 302, 306 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990),
rev'd, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991).
329. See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 358-59.
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curity debt, but the bid was rejected.3 0 After stopping payments on the
loan in April 1986, the Badgetts and Security entered into an agreement
under which certain collateral was auctioned for $374,447.85.131 In Sep-
tember 1986, the Badgetts filed a complaint against Security, alleging
that Security's failure to cooperate in the Badgett's proposed participa-
tion in the federal termination plan constituted a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.332 Although they acknowledged
that there was no express term in the loan agreement requiring Security
to consider their proposal and that Security had no obligation to modify
the agreement, the Badgetts contended that Security "was obligated by
the duty of good faith implicit in every contract to affirmatively cooper-
ate with them in their efforts to participate in the [federal termination
program] and restructure their loan.2333
After the trial court granted summary judgment for Security, the court
of appeals reversed, finding that there was a material issue of fact as to
Security's duty to the Badgetts.334 The appellate court noted that while
the obligation of good faith 335 would not require Security to accept a
material change in the terms of the loan agreement, Security's course of
dealing arguably created a good faith obligation to "consider" the
Badgetts' proposal.336 The Washington Supreme Court, en banc, re-
versed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's dismissal of
330. See iad
331. See id at 359.
332. See id
333. Id at 359-60.
334. See Badgett v. Security State Bank, 786 P.2d 302, 303 (WVash. Ct. App. 1990),
rev'd, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991).
335. Because the loan was secured in part by certain personal property, and therefore
within the scope of Article 9 of the Code, the appellate court based its analysis of good
faith on U.C.C. § 1-203. See id at 304; see also supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text
(discussion of Code definition of good faith). However, the application of § 1-203 was
problematic since the loan was also partially secured by real property, a lien not governed
by the Code. The appellate court nonetheless applied the Code, if only by analogy. See
Badgett, 786 P.2d at 304 ("[B]ecause the UCC reflects many principles of contract law
which are also applicable to the making and performance of agreements governed by
other laws, the Code has often been used as an analogy to situations that are not explicitly
covered by its provisions."). The concurring opinion on appeal questioned whether the
Code applied, but determined that the result reached by the majority would be the same
under Washington common law. See id at 306 (Reed, J., concurring).
336. See Badgett, 786 P.2d at 305-06. As evidence supporting the course of dealing
that gave rise to this obligation, the appellate court stated that there was evidence that the
Bank anticipated changes in its clients' situation and routinely restructured agricultural
loans to meet the requirements of these changing circumstances. There was evidence that
this had been the pattern of the bank's relationship with the Badgetts for six years, even
resulting in the Bank's agreement to a similar liquidation proposal in 1984. "The final
loan agreement, itself, indicated the possibility of amendments." Id at 305. The 1985
agreement provided that, although additional advances or increased commitments were
not contemplated, if such advances or commitments were made while the agreement was
in effect such advances or commitments were subject to the terms and conditions of the
agreement as amended. See id at 305 n.3.
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the Badgetts' claim. 3 3 7
According to the supreme court, the duty of good faith was not as
broad as either the Badgetts or the court of appeals suggested. Although
the duty obligated the parties "to cooperate with each other so that each
may obtain the full benefit of performance," the duty only arose in con-
nection with terms agreed to by the parties and did not "'inject substan-
tive terms into the parties' contract.' ,338 Unlike the court of appeals,
the supreme court refused to consider any evidence of a prior course of
dealing, because the express terms of the agreement would "prevail over
any inference based on a course of dealing. '339 Further, the court con-
tinued that although Security could choose to renegotiate the loan agree-
ment with the Badgetts, it had no implied good faith duty to do so apart
from the terms of the contract. 340 The court noted the open-ended effect
that a duty to consider proposals might have. Such a duty, in the court's
view, might lead to a duty to negotiate, increasing the transactions costs
for the parties.341' Additionally, a duty to negotiate could result in an
action for failure to negotiate in good faith.342 If accepted, the Badgetts'
claim of affirmative cooperation, would, in the court's view, hinder rather
than facilitate the certainty of transactions.
The arguments made before the Badgett court severely undermine any
337. See Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 357-58 (Wash. 1991).
338. Id. at 360. (quoting Barrett v. Weyerhaeuser Co. Severance Pay Plan, 700 P.2d
338 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)).
339. Id. at 362 n.4. "As a matter of law, there cannot be a breach of the duty of good
faith when a party simply stands on its rights to require performance of a contract ac-
cording to its terms." Id. at 360; see also Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Westwood Lumber,
Inc., 829 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing and applying Badgett ap-
proach to course of dealing).
340. See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 361. The court refused to decide whether a good faith
duty to renegotiate or "consider proposals" arose in connection with express contract
terms. See id. at 362. In an earlier non-lender case the Washington Supreme Court had
indicated that the implied duty of good faith and the derivative duty of cooperation may
impose an implicit obligation on a party to consider proposals for modification. See Met-
ropolitan Park Dist. v. Griffith, 723 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
Metropolitan Park involved a concession agreement entered into by a restaurant owner
and the city of Tacoma, Washington granting to the owner an exclusive right to operate
concession stands in municipal parks. See id. at 1095. The owner subsequently made
proposals to the Park Board to permit consumption of alcohol and to allow a sit-down
restaurant in a city park. See id. at 1096. The court held that the Park Board may have
had a good faith duty to consider the proposals because the parties contemplated some
sort of development in the concessions at the time the agreement was executed. See id. at
1100. However, the supreme court's decision in Badgett clearly calls into question the
interpretation of good faith set forth in Metropolitan Park.
341. See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 361 n.3.
342. See id. Compare Speidel, Price Adjustments, supra note 117, at 404-10 (advocat-
ing legal duty to negotiate price adjustments in long-term contracts with action for bad
faith refusal to adjust) with Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to
Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 524 (1985) (no duty to adjust).
Badgett follows the generally accepted view that a lender has no legal obligation to rene-
gotiate or otherwise work-out the problem loan. See supra note 251 and accompanying
text.
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assertion that the result in the case was brought about by some vague,
intuitive judicial process rather than by conscious deliberation and
choice. Rather, the briefs reflect a deeper theoretical disagreement be-
tween the parties on the appropriate legal scope of the obligation of good
faith. The court's opinion relied on arguments advanced by the Wash-
ington Bankers Association and the American Bankers Association. 3
In an amicus brief, those institutions urged upon the court an efficiency-
based conceptualization of good faith:
The effect of frustrating expectation interests is to raise transaction
costs. The cost of making a contract is increased by anticipated ex-
penses resulting from greater likelihood of litigation over alleged
breach of the duty to bargain. To lessen the risks of litigation, business
firms will take costly preventive measures, not only to ensure compli-
ance with their duty to bargain, but also to build a record enabling
them to prove in court that they have complied. The greatest cost of a
duty to bargain is that of uncertainty. In loan contracts, for example,
the prospects of timely repayment will be less certain. Every loan be-
comes more risky. (Query if now is the time to adopt rules that in-
crease risks to financial institutions.) 344
Counsel for the Badgetts responded to the bank associations' argu-
ments with a highly relational view of good faith. Counsel argued:
4. The Associations' comments on economic policy and economic ef-
ficiency would turn the clock back to 1861 (the publication date of
Ancient Law,345 cited by the Associations). Their view that "the com-
mon law is best understood as a system for maximizing the wealth of
society," is at best a narrow vision of society's larger goals.
5. The Associations' discussion of "reasonable expectations" is also
narrow. It fails to consider the fundamental maxim that "the law ful-
fills reasonable expectations." The Badgetts' reasonable expectations
were that their loan officer would keep his promise.
6. Finally, the Associations' view that the [appellate court] opinion is
"bad jurisprudence" proceeds from a faulty premise. The Associations
charge the Court of Appeals with having created "an overriding im-
plied obligation" out of thin air. On the contrary, the duty of good
faith is well established. It is not created out of thin air, but is a term
of every contract. As such, it does not create a new contractual obliga-
tion ....
On the Badgett facts, it would be "bad jurisprudence" to reject the
ancient concept of good faith. Good jurisprudence demands a
remedy.346
343. See Badgett, 807 P.2d at 361 n.3.
344. Brief for Amici Curiae Washington Bankers Association and American Bankers
Association at 15-16, Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991) (No.
56993-2) (citation omitted).
345. Sir Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law (1861).
346. Answer of Appellants to Brief for Amici Curiae at 11-13, Badgett v. Security
State Bank, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991) (No. 56993-2) (footnote omitted). The relational
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Given these arguments, the friction underlying the decisions of the
Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court in
Badgett takes on a new perspective. The court of appeals decision is con-
sistent with the relational/deeply interpretive approach taken in K.M. C.
The parties' long, interactive relationship and a tense situation between
the bank officer and the borrower necessitated an expansive interpreta-
tion of good faith and fair dealing. Preserving the relationship and fair-
ness toward the borrower outweighed enforcing the literal terms of the
original agreement-status conquered contract. In contrast, the supreme
court decision sets forth the passive approach advanced by the banking
associations. In limiting the obligation of good faith to the terms of
agreement, the court viewed the loan agreement as evidencing a discrete
exchange existing independently from all other dealings between the con-
tractual parties and adequately expressing the intentions of the parties
throughout the duration of the relationship.
Yet, the arguments before the court in Badgett also explain why cases
such as Micronesian Yachts must inevitably end up in court. Every dis-
pute between lender and borrower is necessarily a lawsuit. Transactors
cannot, as provided by the time-honored trope, "bargain in the shadow
of the law." '47 Good faith may require notice prior to demand,348 or it
may not,349 or it may in certain circumstances a.3 0 A failure by the lender
to renegotiate the terms of a loan may lead to claims of bad faith 31 but
so may the lender's attempt to renegotiate.35 2 A lender may have a good
underpinnings of this argument become plain when read in connection with Charles
Fried's depiction of relational contract:
[Under a relational] view, contractual relations establish ties of community be-
tween parties, and such ties generate their own moral imperatives, quite apart
from the limited obligations the parties may have assumed in creating the rela-
tion. This view is (and is intended to be) a deliberate rejection and reversal of
Henry Sumner Maine's classic thesis in Ancient Law that modem law has
moved away from status relations to relations founded on promise, that is, rela-
tions defined by the will of the parties.
Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 76 (1981); see also Matthew P. Bergman, Status,
Contract, and History: A Dialectical View, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 171, 180 (1991) ("Mac-
neil's insight suggests that the law.., has returned to status"); Linzer, supra note 141, at
143 (move away from consent "reflects a move away from the Victorian idealization of
bargained contract (and with it consent and agreement) as the centerpiece of private legal
relations, expressed most famously in Sir Henry Maine's axiom that 'the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract' "). But see
Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 123, at 390-91 n.162 (rejecting Fried's
characterization).
347. For an attempt to provide a methodology for parties to contract around good
faith decisions, see Note, "Contracting Around" the Good Faith Covenant to Avoid Lender
Liability, 1991 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 359.
348. See supra note 226.
349. See supra notes 219, 230.
350. See sources cited supra note 250.
351. See id.
352. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 16-20 (Micronesian Yachts restruc-
turing), 317-29 (Badgett restructuring).
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faith obligation to allow the borrower to seek alternative financing,353 or
it may not.354 If the lender allows the borrower to seek alternative fi-
nancing, however, as the lender did in Micronesian Yachts, it may expose
itself to claims of bad faith.355 The law in the area of lender good faith is
simply too grounded in inherently irreconcilable theoretical conceptual-
izations of the obligation to provide any consistent rules to bargain
around. As Badgett indicates, the conflict in the courts is one of deliber-
ate choice rather than of accident, fortuity, or inattention. This Article
now turns to the preferable conceptualization-the "effectiveness of ex-
press terms" approach.
IV. "EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPRESS TER s": THE
PREFERABLE APPROACH
It is perhaps disheartening that years of lender liability litigation have
yet to resolve debates over the obligation of good faith such as the one
that occurred in Badgett. Perhaps the doctrine of good faith and the
competing conceptualizations which drive it are simply not amenable to
any one articulation satisfactory to all. Regardless of the theoretical per-
spective held, the doctrine of good faith has failed when applied to the
area of lending relationships. Disparate views over the proper interpreta-
tion and application of the obligation of good faith in lending has gener-
ated a corpus of case law that instills uncertainty rather than
predictability. Transactors desiring to conform their actions to the dic-
tates of the law have benefited little from the, at best, nominal positive
rules of conduct that such a period of extensive and costly litigation has
generated.
The lender liability experience, however, discredits concerns that the
obligation of good faith licenses judges to superimpose extracontractual
obligations upon the parties.35 6 The interventionist and relational ap-
proaches appear the least employed. Generally, courts have been sensi-
tive to the parties' contract and agreement. Moreover, the failure of the
cases to generate the body of "good faith law" necessary to provide cer-
tainty and consistency exemplifies the limitations of those approaches in
providing workable standards for the obligation of good faith. The plane
of debate in the courts, rather, lies in differences over the amount of sen-
sitivity which courts should have to the parties' agreement. Hence, the
choice devolves to one between the interpretivist and passive approaches
to good faith. In the lending context, the "effectiveness of express terms"
approach, as set out in Kham & Nate's, is the preferable methodology to
use in enforcing the parties' agreement.
In addition to being supported by strong precedent,35 7 the "effective-
353. See sources cited supra note 250.
354. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 22.
356. See supra note 27.
357. See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, courts' con-
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ness of express terms" approach is further strengthened by persuasive
policy considerations. First, as pointed out in detail in the Grantham
dissent 358 the approach enforces the basic principle of contract interpre-
tation that express terms control over implied terms. 3 9 When a lending
agreement asserts that amounts due thereunder are payable upon de-
mand or upon acceleration by the lender upon a specified event of de-
fault, or that a lender may discontinue financing as provided by the
agreement, any interpretation otherwise necessarily contravenes this
principle. To the extent that the interventionist, interpretivist, or rela-
tional approaches impose requirements of fair play in demanding pay-
ment,31° of restraint in accelerating under the agreement, 361 or of notice
prior to discontinuation of financing, 362 those requirements inexorably
lead to the conclusion that demand does not mean demand, acceleration
does not mean acceleration, or a right to discontinue does not mean a
right to discontinue. Just because the borrower blindly hoped the lender
would not exercise those rights does not create an interpretive event.
Second, the interpretive methods mandate judicial intervention in, and
review of, every lender decision in order to determine the broadly con-
strued "agreement" of the parties. Regardless of whether that effort
could lead to determinable results, it conflicts with other principles bear-
ing upon the enforcement of contracts beyond those of promoting auton-
omy or enforcing expectations in the particular case before the court.
The interpretivist approaches increase the cost of contracting through
invocation of the judicial dispute resolution mechanism in every case.
Further, the interpretivist approaches rely upon transaction-specific facts
which generate little information upon which transactors may rely in
structuring their own affairs, and, by interjecting the state into every dis-
pute, threaten to alter the social relationship between lender and
borrower.363
scious rejection of other theories, see supra text accompanying notes 303-04, 343-46, ren-
ders unpersuasive any assertion that this precedent should be given less weight on the
grounds that the "effectiveness of express terms" approach was not deliberately adopted.
358. See supra text accompanying note 188.
359. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1990) (express terms control over course of dealing
and usage of trade). Advocation of the effectiveness of express terms approach should
not be read as a wholesale rejection of the interpretive value of course of dealing and
usage of trade. Rather, the approach takes a narrower reading (a reading borne out in
numerous courts) that in the context of claims brought by borrowers, which generally
involve the rights of the lender to collect its debt as provided in the contract, anything
other than enforcement of express terms would contravene § 1-205(4). One may attempt
to place those contract provisions, which are not boilerplate but rather the essential terms
of a loan, in as deep a commercial context as one desires and, nonetheless, the express
terms should control. The interpretive approaches to good faith merely allow judicial
error and jury sympathies to override this obvious conclusion.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
361. See supra note 104 and text accompanying notes 248-51.
362. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 116, at 2054 (discussing effects of legal intervention on
social norms).
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For example, current interpretivist approaches fail to accommodate
the proposition that parties may have intended to leave their dispute to
non-legal enforcement. 3 "4 Reliance upon reputational failures to man-
date such broad, sweeping judicial control over contracting behavior
rests on two interrelated factual issues: (1) whether the risk of dishonora-
ble behavior by lenders is palpable, and (2) if so, whether the magnitude
of that risk, given reputational constraints, justifies imposition of an im-
mensely costly mechanism of judicial intervention to police such behav-
ior in every instance. Surely the time-honored convention of "banker-
bashing" that perceives lenders as arbitrary and interested only in ad-
vancing their economic self-interest at any cost cannot support advocat-
ing judicial policing of such behavior.365 One must assume bankers to be
responsible actors even in the face of such perceptions.366 Nonetheless,
some lender liability cases do indicate some socially undesirable behavior
on the part of lenders.367 Absent evidence that market constraints are
failing to police such behavior, or evidence that borrowers have inade-
quate or unaffordable access to information about the integrity of their
potential lenders,368 however, it does not follow that a broad interpretive
standard for good faith is necessary. Thus, any reputational justification
for an interpretive standard for good faith is speculative.
Finally, the interpretive approaches place upon the lender insurmount-
able and costly burdens in attempting to draft an agreement that ade-
quately will convey to the borrower the "meaning" of that agreement.
For example, consider the following loan covenant: "The Borrower shall
not sell any collateral without the Lender's advance written consent." Is
it less costly from a drafting perspective for the lender to hypothesize and
articulate the alternative opportunities of which it might wish to take
advantage than to require the borrower to articulate under which cir-
364. For a discussion of extra-legal enforcement, see generally Charny, supra note 10.
365. Bankers even from ancient times have been the target of abuse. Consider the
following passage from the Minoponeros ("The Hater of Rogues"), a lost comedy of
Antiphanes, on the relative disagreeability of certain classes in ancient Athenian society:
A. And are not the Scythians wise indeed? For as soon as their children are
born, they give them the milk of mares and cows to drink.
B. And, by Zeus, they don't bring in to look after them malignant nurses or,
later on, pedagogues; there could be no greater pests.
A. Excepting midwives, by Zeus, because they are in a class by themselves.
B. And excepting the begging priests of Cybele; for they are by far the foulest
breed of all.
A. Unless, by Zeus, you want to call fishmongers the foulest.
B. But only after bankers (trapezitai): there is no more pestilential tribe than
theirs.
Paul Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens 197 (1991).
366. For a thoughtful and persuasive defense of bankers' individual recognition of
"moral duty, social responsibility, and the commercial value of an untarnished public
image," see Ebke & Griffin, Conceptual Framework, supra note 10, at 807-08.
367. See, eg., cases cited supra note 96; see also Fischel, supra note 7, at 138-39 (dis-
cussing failures of reputational constraints).
368. See, eg., Charny, supra note 10, at 459.
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cumstances it might wish to sell collateral over which it has control?
That the lender is in any better position is not obvious. Similarly, con-
sider the following acceleration provision:
The sale of any collateral by the Borrower shall constitute an event of
default hereunder upon the occurrence of which event of default the
Lender shall have the right, without notice to the Borrower, to declare
all or any portion of the outstanding principal amounts hereunder to
be due and payable, whereupon such amounts so declared due and
payable shall be and become immediately due and payable.
Again, it does not evidently follow that the costs incurred by the lender
in hypothesizing and articulating the possibility of an uncertain future in
which invocation of the acceleration clause might advance any ethereal
purposes for which the term was included in the agreement outweigh
those incurred by the borrower in formulating its future plans to dispose
of, or business requirements which might necessitate disposal of, collat-
eral within its control and to articulate those plans or requirements to the
lender. Simply put, the borrower most often is in the best position to
have put the issue on the table.
The interpretive approaches raise two other minor issues bearing upon
the costs of contracting and the negotiating process. First, an interpre-
tive approach places the lender in a unique bargaining position: the pro-
posed interpretive standards peculiarly require the lender ex ante
affirmatively to bring to the bargaining table all the reasons for which-
or circumstances under which-it may wish to back out or all of its per-
ceived purposes for the agreement. The borrower need only evaluate
such reasons or purposes and is not affirmatively required to articulate
the circumstances under which it is willing to repay the loan which the
lender is interested in making. The lender must adopt a negotiating
strategy of affirmatively protecting its right to back out of the loan-a
strategy certain to alienate borrowers and hardly facilitative of a non-
confrontational bargaining process.
Related thereto, an interpretive approach impedes one of the functions
of covenants in loan contract negotiation. Terms introduced into negoti-
ation are ordinarily understood by most transactors to perform an infor-
mation-forcing function in the contract negotiation stage. For example,
the borrower, upon seeing a default term such as the one set forth above
might communicate valuable information to the lender about the bor-
rower's business (for example, that the borrower intends to sell a subsidi-
ary). This exchange performs a "due diligence" function in evaluating
the borrower and in structuring a credit facility that, to the best extent
possible, most meets the borrower's needs. To the extent that legal rules
impede this exchange of information, both banks and borrowers poten-
tially suffer. Banks may make riskier loans and borrowers may receive a
financial product not individually tailored to their needs.
Thus, unless the position is that the legal system should protect the
broadly interpreted agreement of the parties at all costs, an interpretive
1026 [Vol. 61
1993] LENDER LIABILITY GOOD FAITH LITIGATION
role for the courts in lender liability cases remains questionable. The
grave social, institutional, and economic toll of implementation of the
interpretivist approaches is unjustified. The "effectiveness of express
terms" judicial strategy, undergirded by the law and economics approach
to good faith prohibits opportunism by the lender and most adequately
advances the interests of both lender and borrower. Although the deter-
mination of whether particular acts are opportunistic is indeed a difficult
one,369 the disengagement of the obligation of good faith from the notion
of "agreement" minimizes the shortcomings of the interpretivist ap-
proaches raised above. Parties no longer would be hamstrung through-
out their relationship by the enormous threat of unpredictable post hoc
guesswork by judges and juries.
Claims that widespread implementation of the effectiveness of express
terms approach, in conjunction with a prohibition on opportunistic be-
havior, will destroy any viability of the obligation of good faith as a
check on egregious lender behavior can be allayed by an examination of
the dispute in First Fidelity Bank v. People Care, Ina 0 In People Care,
First Fidelity Bank (Fidelity) provided a $2,000,000 line of credit, paya-
ble upon demand, to People Care, Inc. (People Care), a provider of home
health care services.3 7' A year after entering into the agreement, Fidelity
demanded a payment of principal under the note. Soon thereafter, Fidel-
ity demanded that the loan be restructured and threatened to engage in
"dramatic or precipitous action": using its ability to demand under the
note and thereby force People Care to go under if it failed to accede to
Fidelity's demands.372 Although People Care's financial condition stead-
ily improved,373 Fidelity's threats continued. As a result, People Care
executed a forbearance agreement which included a higher interest rate
and a balloon payment of principal that was contrary to the bank's inter-
nal policies. 74 Subsequent to the forbearance agreement, Fidelity re-
peatedly assured People Care that, as long as People Care made
payments pursuant to the agreement, it would make extensions of the
forbearance agreement.3 7 5 Instead, without warning, Fidelity instituted
an action to collect upon the note. 376 The trial court, on these facts,
denied Fidelity's motion for summary judgment and allowed the matter
to go to trial.37 7
369. See supra text accompanying note 153. However, the current disarray of lender
liability litigation may be one source of the difficulty in determining opportunistic behav-
ior. Refocusing the analysis may generate predictable rules.
370. No. L-01554-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 3, 1991) (order denying motion
for summary judgment).
371. See id; Transcript of Proceedings, People Care, at 4-6. The amount available was
subsequently increased to $2,300,000. See id. at 7.
372. See Transcript of Proceedings, People Care, at 7-8.
373. See id. at 8, 10.
374. See id. at 8-9.
375. See id. at 10.
376. See id.
377. See id at 12-15; First Fidelity Bank v. People Care, Inc., No. L-001554-90 (NJ.
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Fidelity's handling of its loan to People Care was indisputably shock-
ing and, under any theory of good faith, the trial court's decision is justi-
fied. A contractual moralist would assert that good faith and principles
of contractual morality precluded Fidelity's abuse of its power over Peo-
ple Care. Interpretivists would look deeply into the parties' agreement
and the term "demand" to assess whether Fidelity's behavior contra-
vened that agreement and the parties' reasonable expectations thereun-
der. Relationists would examine the parties' relationship as it extended
through the course of the arrangement to determine the normative
framework governing the relationship. Yet, the law and economics ap-
proach focuses on issues that more concisely identify where Fidelity went
wrong, thus providing guidance to subsequent transactors: a reasonable
jury could find that Fidelity acted opportunistically when it exercised its
leverage over People Care to extract a better deal than it initially bar-
gained for.3 78 In sum, the effectiveness of express terms approach to
good faith, which gives terms in lending agreements their commonly un-
derstood meaning and prohibits only opportunistic behavior, protects
borrowers from egregious lender behavior while also providing standards
which lenders can conform their actions. Beyond that, other legal pro-
tections to parties in lending agreements ought to be furnished by tradi-
tional contract law doctrines such as modification, estoppel, waiver, and
unconscionability rather than by a noble, yet unworkable, concept of
good faith.
CONCLUSION
One significant concern raised in the debates over introduction of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the Restatement focused on
the obligation's potential to invoke widespread "judicial remaking of
contracts."3 79 A comprehensive analysis of the history of lender liability
litigation indicates that, for the most part, United States courts are re-
sisting that temptation. Although not entirely unprecedented, judicial
activism which uses the obligation of good faith to impose standards of
conduct irrespective of the parties' agreement is rare. The recent shift in
some courts to a vocally passive strategy toward good faith issues in lend-
Super. Ct. Law Div. filed May 3, 1991) (order denying motion for summary judgment).
After denial of summary judgment, the case was settled. See First Fidelity Bank v. Peo-
ple Care, Inc., No. L-001554-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 19, 1991) (order dis-
missing complaint and counterclaims with prejudice and without costs).
378. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1990) ("Bank did not break a promise at a time Debtor was especially vulnera-
ble, then use the costs and delay of obtaining legal enforcement of the contract as levers
to a better deal."); In re Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 B.R. 228, 238 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1986) (lenders should not "be able to refuse financing at the last minute in an attempt to
secure concessions from its customers more favorable to the lender"); Fischel, supra note
7, at 138 ("[W]henever a lender attempts to renegotiate with the borrower for better
terms when there is no basis for doing so, the lender is behaving opportunistically.").
379. 47 ALI Proceedings 490-91 (1970).
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ing reaffirms that the initial concerns over the introduction of the obliga-
tion of good faith ought not be a source of extreme apprehension.
Accordingly, lenders may rest a little easier knowing that they are win-
ning in the courts and their agreements generally will be enforced.
Despite the absence of a liability crisis for lenders, the existing litiga-
tion crisis points to the crucial need for a consistent judicial strategy in
determining good faith conduct in lending agreements. The divergent
conceptualizations of good faith and the numerous judicial strategies
which have failed to generate consistent, positive rules of conduct to
which lenders may safely conform have placed lenders, such as the Bank
of Guam in Micronesian Yachts, in a position where they are forced into
long and costly litigation of often spurious claims.
The "effectiveness of express terms" approach to good faith lending
retains a role for the judiciary in policing lenders' opportunistic behavior
while minimizing the potential for spurious claims of bad faith. This
approach best balances the interests of both borrower and lender. Ab-
sent widespread judicial adoption of the "effectiveness of express terms"
approach, the current business climate in which lenders must deem every
loan a lawsuit, every borrower a plaintiff, and every act actionable will
continue. This prospect calls for a deeper consideration of abolishing the
contractual obligation of good faith as it applies to lending agreements.
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Total for Year Borrower's Favor
1 (50.00%)
1 (25.00%)
1 (100%)
1 (33.33%)
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Lender's Favor
1 (50.00%)
1 (100%)
3 (75.00%)
2 (66.67%)
(100%)(100%)
(66.67%)
(100%)
(25.00%)
(60.00%)
(85.71%)
(80.00%)
(75.00%)
(60.00%)
(16.67%)
(77.78%)
(69.23%)
(41.67%)
(76.47%)
(84.21%)
(89.47%)
(76.92%)
(84.21%)
TOTAL 223 57 
(25.56%) 166 (74.43%)
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(75.00%)
(40.00%)
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(20.00%)
(25.00%)
(40.00%)
(83.33%)
(22.22%)
(30.77%)
(58.33%)
(23.53%)
(15.79%)
(10.53%)
(23.08%)
(15.79%)
166 (74.43%) 223 57 (25.56%)
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APPENDIX B
FEDERAL/STATE ALLOCATION
Total
for Year State Federal
1964 2 1 (50.00%) 1 (50.00%)
1965
1966
1967
1968 1 1 (100%)
1969 4 3 (75.00%) 1 (25.00%)
1970
1971 1 1 (100%)
1972 3 3 (100%)
1973
1974 1 1 (100%)
1975 4 3 (75.00%) 1 (25.00%)
1976 3 3 (100%)
1977 2 2 (100%)
1978 4 3 (75.00%) 1 (25.00%)
1979 5 4 (80.00%) 1 (20.00%)
1980 7 6 (85.71%) 1 (14.29%)
1981 5 5 (100%)
1982 4 4 (100%)
1983 5 5 (100%)
1984 6 5 (83.33%) 1 (16.67%)
1985 9 8 (88.89%) 1 (11.11%)
1986 13 11 (84.62%) 2 (15.38%)
1987 12 6 (50.00%) 6 (50.00%)
1988 17 11 (64.70%) 6 (35.30%)
1989 19 16 (84.21%) 3 (15.79%)
1990 19 15 (78.95%) 4 (21.05%)
1991 39 24 (61.54%) 15 (38.46%)
1992 38 17 (44.74%) 21 (55.26%)
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APPENDIX C
FEDERAL/STA TE RESUL TS
State Federal
Total Total
for year Borrower Lender for year Borrower Lender
1964 1 - 1 (100%) 1 1 (100%)
1965 -
1966
1967 -
1968 1 - 1 (100%) - -
1969 3 1 (33.33%) 2 (66.67%) 1 - 1 (100%)
1970 - - - - -
1971 1 1 (100%) - -
1972 3 1 (33.33%) 2 (66.67%) - -
1973 - - - - -
1974 1 - 1 (100%) - -
1975 3 - 3 (100%) 1 - 1 (100%)
1976 3 1 (33.33%) 2 (66.67%) -
1977 2 - 2 (100%)
1978 3 3 (100%) - 1 - 1 (100%)
1979 4 1 (25.00%) 3 (75.00%) 1 1 (100%)
1980 6 1 (16.67%) 5 (83.33%) 1 - 1 (100%)
1981 5 1 (20.00%) 4 (80.00%) - -
1982 4 1 (25.00%) 3 (75.00%) -
1983 5 2 (40.00%) 3 (60.00%) - -
1984 5 4 (80.00%) 1 (20.00%) 1 1 (100%) -
1985 8 1 (12.50%) 7 (87.50%) 1 1 (100%) -
1986 11 4 (36.36%) 7 (63.64%) 2 - 2 (100%)
1987 6 4 (66.67%) 2 (33.33%) 6 3 (50.00%) 3 (50.00%)
1988 11 3 (27.27%) 8 (72.73%) 6 1 (16.67%) 5 (83.33%)
1989 16 3 (18.75%) 13 (81.25%) 3 - 3 (100%)
1990 15 2 (13.33%) 13 (86.67%) 4 4 (100%)
1991 24 7 (29.17%) 17 (70.83%) 15 2 (13.33%) 13 (86.67%)
1992 17 1 (5.88%) 16 (94.12%) 21 5 (23.81%) 16 (76.19%)
TOTAL 158 42 (26.58%) 116 (73.42%) 65 15 (23.08%) 50 (76.92%)
